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Filling in Gaps in Support and Regulation of Transnational Relationships 
Philip M. Nichols*
Summary 
The prosecution in the United States of Pavlo Lazarenko for corruption merits study for 
two reasons.  First, it provides case study of the use of local laws to deal with a transnational act.  
Law should support and regulates interaction within communities; local laws that stop at the 
borders do little to support transnational communities and international law, which does not 
recognize most transnational persons as legitimate subjects of international law, does even less.  
The court that tried Lazarenko could not therefore rely solely on its local law nor could it turn to 
nonexistent transnational law; instead it cobbled together local U.S. law and local Ukrainian law.  
At different times in the process, the court exhibited skill and a lack of sensitivity to the process. 
 In cobbling together local laws, the court also created a tool for controlling 
transnationally corrupt public officials.  Corruption presents a significant obstacle to global and 
local development and growth.  The creation of a tool to combat transnational corruption offers 
possible amelioration for many more who suffer the degradations of corruption. 
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In August of 2006, a United States District Court in San Francisco sentenced Pavlo 
Lazarenko, the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, to serve nine years in prison.1 Pavlo 
Lazarenko stood convicted of corrupt acts, including money laundering, wire fraud, and 
transportation of stolen property.2 Lazarenko certainly does not stand alone as a convicted 
corrupt politician.3 His conviction is unique, however, as the first in the United States of a 
foreign leader based in part on the violation of laws in that leader’s home country.4
The particulars of Lazarenko’s case are provocative.  Lazarenko inflicted a tremendous 
amount of damage on Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  He subverted the transition of a nation 
emerging from years of occupation.  He manipulated banks and financial institutions in a number 
of countries.5 In the particulars, his conviction constitutes justice. 
 Even more important than the particulars of Lazarenko’s actions, however, although not 
as sensational, is the manner in which the trial court used laws.  Lazarenko did not conform his 
malfeasance to the borders of a single country; like many corrupt officials his actions took place 
across political boundaries.  Lazarenko was an internationally corrupt person.  The traditional 
theory of international law, however, does not recognize Lazarenko as an international actor, and 
therefore does not provide a means to control him. 
 
1 See Jesse McKinley, 9 Years In U.S. Prison For Ex-Premier. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at A3 
(describing sentence and noting that this was the first conviction of a former leader since that of 
Manuel Noriega of Panama). 
2 See United States v. Lazarenko, 469 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2006), reprinted as am’d  United 
States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2623 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007), am’d, rehear’g denied,
rehear’g en banc denied, United States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2612 (9th Cir. Feb. 
7, 2007) (describing the conviction). 
3 See Peter W. Schroth, Corruption and Accountability of the Civil Service in the United States,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 553, 553-568 (2006) (providing examples of corruption proceedings in the 
United States); see generally John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 293, (2000) (book review) (discussing corruption in the United States). 
4 Manuel Noriega was convicted of violations of U.S. laws.  See Recent Case – Separation of 
Powers – Head-of-State Immunity – Eleventh Circuit Holds That the Executive Branch’s Capture 
of Noriega Exempts Him from Head-of-State Immunity, 111 HARV. L. REV. 849, 849 (1998) 
(noting that the United States charged Manuel Noriega with violation of U.S. drug laws). 
5 See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. 
The failure of international law does not mean that Lazarenko’s behavior should escape 
punishment.6 Corruption presents perhaps the greatest obstacle to social and economic 
development throughout the world.7 The world is increasingly comprised of transnational 
communities, but international law fails to support or to regulate these transnational 
communities, particularly with respect to the control of corruption.8 Until international law 
catches up to the world, some other means of supporting or controlling transnational behaviors 
must be devised.  Cobbling together local laws so that they roughly fit transnational behaviors 
provides one interim solution.  That is precisely what occurred in the conviction of Pavlo 
Lazarenko:  a United States District Court cobbled together two sets of local laws to create a 
viable and fair mechanism for trying a transnational criminal. 
 The conviction of Pavlo Lazarenko is meaningful because justice always matters, and a 
bad person has earned his dues.9 The trial of Pavlo Lazarenko, however, is perhaps even more 
noteworthy as a case study of the cobbling together of local laws.  As with any case study, it 
supplies lessons regarding best and worst practices.10 The trial of Pavlo Lazarenko also suggests 
a new and potent tool for combating the devastating phenomenon of transnational corruption.  
For these reasons, any person interested in either transnational communities in general or 
corruption in particular must examine this case. 
 This paper begins with an exposition of the general failure of international law.11 It then 
briefly recounts the actions of Pavlo Lazarenko, and explains how corruption damages societies 
 
6 See Patrick Donahue, Corruption Watchdog Downgrades U.S.:  Scandals Hurt America’s 
Standing, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A25 (quoting the executive officer of Transparency 
International as emphasizing a need for some device for prosecuting transnationally corrupt 
actors). 
7 See Alexandru Grigorescu, The Corruption Eruption in East-Central Europe:  The Increased 
Salience of Corruption and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations, 20 E. EUR. POL. &
SOC. 516, 519 (2006) (Corruption “is now seen as one of the greatest threats to the survival of 
new democracies around the world.”). 
8 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; Antonin Cohen, Constitutionalism Without 
Constitution:  Transnational Elites Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the 
Making of a Constitution for Europe (1940s81960s), 32 LAW & SOC. INQ. 109, 109-110 (2007) 
(describing the creation of a transnational community not aided by local legal systems); Philip 
M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 261-269 (1999) (discussing transnational communities). 
9 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:  Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal 
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1443 (2001) (“doing justice is an important value in its own 
right”). 
10 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 656 (1998) (using the “case study” of a Moscow 
storefront to find insights into the role of law in a transition economy); Robert A. Katzmann, 
Making Sense of Congressional Intent:  Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE 
L.J. 2345, 2353 (1995) (“case studies have important implications for scholars interested in the 
role of courts in the policy process”). 
11 See infra notes 16-58 and accompanying text. 
such as Ukraine’s.12 The paper then examines the trial of Pavlo Lazarenko through analysis of 
two orders issued by the trying court.13 The paper looks at what was done well and what was not 
done well in those orders, and the interplay between a trial of this type and issues surrounding 
sovereignty.14 Finally, the paper fixes the technique exemplified by the trial of Lazarenko into 
the network of tools available for dealing with transnational corruption.15 
1. Criticisms of International Law 
Criticisms of international law abound.16 The predominant theory of international law, 
and thus the primary target of such criticism, traces its philosophical roots to Aristotle, its 
primary assumptions regarding international actors to the Treaty of Westphalia, and its principle 
tenets to Grotius and Leibniz.17 Other theoretical frameworks with roots in other places, such as 
Vedic tenets18 or the Ikh Yasa of the vast Mongolian empire19 or rules of the African 
 
12 See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text; see also notes 74-128 and accompanying text 
(discussing damage caused by corruption) 
13 See infra notes 129-206 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 207-269 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 270-302 and accompanying text. 
16 See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law:  A Bibliography,
35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (1994) (noting “a dramatic increase during the past two decades in 
the volume of scholarly work that aims to rethink the foundations of international law and to 
respond to recent trends in political, social, and legal theory”); Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on 
the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 404 
(1994) (discussing criticism of the concept of sovereignty). 
17 See JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (9th ed. 1984); see also 
Ann-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law,
10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 721-22 (1995) (noting that the realist school dominated 
international relations theory for “virtually the past two millennia, from Thucydides to 
Machiavelli to Morgenthau”). 
18 See VED P. NANDA & SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, HINDU LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (1996); S.N. 
Al Habsy & Kishor Uprety, Cooperation for Nominal Development or Politics for Actual 
Survival?  South Asia in the Making of International Law, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 23-
24 (2002) (discussing the role of South Asia on the formation of international law).  Hindu 
principles of international law differ from European tenets in that ancient Hindu rules governing 
the interactions among sovereigns were based on Dharma rather than on consensus.  See Ved P. 
Nanda, International Law in Ancient Hindu India, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).  Similarly, “Islamic law, 
and hence Islamic international law, simply holds a different conception of law than does 
Western law, and hence public international law. . . . Islamic law draws its legitimacy from God, 
not from agreement. Therefore Islam cannot adduce consent, as does public international law, as 
the justification for public order.”  David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public 
International Law:  Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 819, 870, 877-78 
(1993) (footnotes omitted). 
kingdoms,20 were ground to dust or overwhelmed during the European period of colonization.21 
More recent theories of international law based on other intellectual paradigms, such as that 
propounded by socialist systems22 or by critical legal studies,23 have had nowhere near the 
influence of the dominant theory of international law.24 
19 See JACK WEATHERFORD, GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD xix 
(2004) (describing rules governing relations among different cultures in Mongolian Empire); 
Denise1 Aigle, Le Grand Jasaq de Gengis-Khan, l’empire, la Culture Mongole et la Shari’a,
47 J. ECON. & SOC. HIST. ORIENT 31, 31-60 (2004) (discussing content of the law and the 
distinction between written law and customary law).  Saul Levmore describes the Ikh Yasa 
without focusing on the manner in which it organized relations between cultures.  See Saul 
Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law:  Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort 
Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235, 280-85 (1986); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue:  An Essay on the 
Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 
924-28 (1986).  Weatherford points out that many aspects of the Mongolian ordering of 
international relationships continue to exist in the modern system – including diplomatic 
immunity.  WEATHERFORD, supra, at xix. 
20 See David N. Edwards, Meroe and the Sudanic Kingdoms, 39 J. AFR. HIST. 175, 176-90 
(1998) (discussing the relationships between the Kushite States and Sudanic Kingdoms); Richard 
Reid, Mutesa and Mirambo:  Thoughts on East African Warfare and Diplomacy in the 
Nineteenth Century, 31 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 73, 73-81 (1998) (discussing rules and 
relationships between the Bugando Kingdom and the Nyamwezi Empire in the second half of the 
nineteenth century). 
21 Christopher Blakesley states: 
 
The international law of today does not show distinct linkages to ancient Oriental 
and African practices. Even the modern descendants of very old Oriental cultures 
accept international law as the product of Western evolution. Ignorance and 
neglect in the West of the history of law and related institutions in the East 
constitute the most likely explanation of this omission. Scholars in some of the 
modern States that have evolved from the Oriental historical matrix sometimes 
chide the West for this inattention and threaten (usually mildly) to set the matter 
aright sometime. New States in Africa sometimes are heard in similar vein. 
 
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1432 (5th ed. 2001): 
see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:  Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1-2 (1999) (“The universalization of 
international law was principally a consequence of the imperial expansion that took place 
towards the end of the ‘long nineteenth century.’ . . . By 1914, after numerous colonial wars, 
virtually all the territories of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific were controlled by the major European 
states, resulting in the assimilation of all these non-European peoples into a system of law that 
was fundamentally European in that it derived from European thought and experience.”). 
22 See THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH, SOZIALISTISCHES VOLKERRECHT? 272-85 (1979) (the “highest 
principles” of international law include close cooperation, mutual assistance, brotherly 
friendship, and unity and compactness); Francis A. Gabor, A Socialist Approach to Codification 
The complexity of any school of thought defies simple explanation;25 nonetheless, put 
simply traditional international law positions itself as a set of rules through which nations 
interact with one another.26 Nations are the principal international actors, with some recognition 
of international organizations created by those nations.27 A foundational principle of 
international law is that international law concerns itself only with the relations among the 
nations and not with the internal processes within those nations.28 Thus, it could be said that 
“international law is the law of nations.”29 
European international law’s preoccupation with sovereign nations as the only legitimate 
international actors, however, is more a historical accident than a discovery of an immutable 
truth.30 Indeed, Grotius, who most credit with the first modern compilation of western 
international rules in De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres,31 did not concern himself with the nature 
 
of Private International Law in Hungary: Comments and Translation, 55 TUL. L. REV. 63 (1980) 
(discussing socialist principles of transnational law. 
23 See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 81 
(1991) (suggesting a theory of international law that rejects states as primary international actors, 
rejects the possibility of objective consensus, and rejects the idea of determinate international 
legal obligations and rules). 
24 See BLAKESLEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 1432 (“Classical, scholarly Marxists, and many who 
are non-Marxist, deprecate the system of customary international law because it seems to them 
unavoidably to state, as law, rules and principles fostering the interests of the power elites 
asserting them. The socialist States of the former Second World, however, came in practice to 
accept the system and many of its most conventional rules and principles, while selectively 
seeking to deny status as law to other rules and principles because they are contradictory to 
national ideological or other preferences.”). 
25 Slaughter cautions against oversimplifying the corpus of traditional international law.  Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law:  Liberal 
International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
717, 727 (1995). 
26 See LOUIS OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (4th ed. 1928) (stating that nations are the 
actors in international law). 
27 See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415 (2000) (stating 
that nations have ceded some place in international law to international organizations). 
28 See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 26, at 20-21 (setting out the principles of traditional 
international legal scholarship); Hersch Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 8 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 106-07 (1927) (same); see also Sol Picciotto, Networks in International 
Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17 J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1014, 1018 (1996) (discussing the relationship between traditional international law and the 
realist school of international relations and noting that both are state centered). 
29 Egon Guttman, The Concept of Neutrality Since the Adoption and Ratification of the Hague 
Neutrality Convention of 1907, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 55, 58 (1998). 
30 See PHILLIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 249 (1990) (“The 
misconceiving of international society as a system of closed sovereignties, externalized state-
systems, undemocratized and unsocialized, spread throughout the world.”). 
31 See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9, 20 (1966). 
the international actor.32 That task was undertaken by Grotius’s intellectual descendant Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, a diplomat for and advisor to various rulers of German principalities;33 Leibniz 
spent his life balancing the overarching rule of the Holy Roman Empire against the independence 
of his employers.34 Of necessity Leibniz found that sovereigns (his employers) and the polities 
they ruled were legitimate international actors.35 Samuel Pufendorf, who followed Leibniz, also 
wrestled with the need to legitimize independent states as they freed themselves from the 
weakened Holy Roman Empire.36 He posited that independent states “and supreme sovereignty 
come from God as the author of natural law,”37 thus providing a foundation upon which the 
independent states could place themselves on equal footing with the empire – an argument based 
on their divine right to international personhood.  The concepts born of the exigencies of Leibniz 
and Pufendorf became dogma as generations of international legal scholars – from Wolff through 
 
32 See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 
21-22 (1946) (“The significance of the law of nature in his [Grotius’] treatise is that it is the ever-
present source for supplementing the voluntary law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the 
light of ethics and reason, and for making the reader aware of the fact that the will of states 
cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last resort, the decisive source of the law of nations.”).  
Thomas Hobbes is also sometimes credited with contributing to the intellectual roots of modern 
European international law, even though he himself did not believe in international law.  
Precisely because he did not believe in international law he also did not concern himself with the 
nature of international actors.  See John P. Humphrey, On the Foundations of International Law,
39 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 233 (1945) (noting Hobbes’ belief that “[e]ither a state is sovereign, in 
which case it cannot be bound by any law higher than its own, or it is bound by law, in which 
case it ceases to be sovereign”); Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International 
Criminal Court:  An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 435 (2006) (noting Hobbes belief that there was no authority binding 
sovereigns). 
33 JANNE ELISAPETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2004) (stating that Leibniz 
was the first writer to us the term “international legal person” and noting that he was an 
intellectual successor to Grotius and Hobbes). 
34 E.J. AITON, LEIBNIZ: A BIOGRAPHY (1985); see Carl Friedrich, Philosophical Reflections of 
Leibniz on Law, Politics and the State, in LEIBNIZ: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, 47, 47-
51 (Harry Frankfurt ed., 1972) (discussing the historical and intellectual background of Leibniz’s 
work). 
35 See NIJMAN, supra note 33, at 36-38 (discussing the relationship between Leibniz’s occupation 
and his writings on international law) 
36 Leibniz, Pufendorf and others also wrote in the shadow of the brutal Thirty Years War.  See 
Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 527 (2004) (“[J]us gentium 
earned its international appeal after the Thirty Years War devastated several centuries’ brilliant 
civilizational achievements in Europe.  After witnessing the misery of the war, pioneering 
philosophers and legal scholars strived to achieve a mutually supportive and peaceful human 
community. These innovators attempted to tame and regulate brutal and irrational human 
behaviors – often committed in the name of sovereignty – through jus gentium.”). 
37 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS Book VII.III 1 and 2, p.1000-1 
(transl. & ed. Classics of International Law 1934). 
Vattel and Kant to Kelsen – preoccupied themselves with this conception in international legal 
personhood and developed rules for interaction between those international persons.38 
For many years this accidental body of law was criticized as sterile and positivist, little 
more than a description of the ways in which nations interacted.39 The most significant 
refinement of international law in the recent era responded to this criticism:  the New Haven 
school inserted international politics into international law and endowed international law with 
purpose as a tool for policy objectives.40 These changes were lauded as significant, but most of 
the basic contours and assumptions remained untouched, including the focus on the nation as the 
only legitimate international actor.41 
The event that most clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of international law theory in 
the twentieth century was the atrocity of the second world war.42 The fact that international legal 
theory had no basis for condemning the internal acts of brutal governments startled many 
scholars and lay people, and lead to two significant developments:  the infusion of natural law 
principles into international law, and a growing realization that international law not only enables 
international interaction but also imposes some strictures on the behaviors of individual 
nations.43 
38 See NIJMAN, supra note 33, at 84-85 (discussing the influence of Leibniz and Pufendorf on 
succeeding generations of international law scholarship). 
39 See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning 
of International Law:  An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 
138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968) (criticizing international law as a 
“repository of legal rationalizations”); Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International 
Law, I BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA 73, 87-88 (1923) (vigorously attacking positivism in 
international legal scholarship); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and 
Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819 (1990) (criticizing “sterile positivism” in 
international law scholarship). 
40 See Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell:  The New Haven School of International Law, 104
YALE L.J. 1991, 1992 (1995) (book review) (noting that the New Haven School “breaks 
radically” from positivism); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical 
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819-820 (1990) (“Connecting law with context and policy, 
the approach [the New England School] shows that legal decisions involve choice.”). 
41 Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law, 42 KAN. L. 
REV. 557, 593-94 (1994); see LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 10 (1989) (an advocate of the New 
Haven School suggests that there is too much emphasis on the state). 
42 David J. Bederman, The New International Law in an Old Age of Indeterminacy, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1521, 1527-28 (2003) (book review); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and 
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 227-29 (1997); see Anne-
Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory:  A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 207-20 (1993) (reviewing development of international legal scholarship 
following the second world war). 
43 Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power:  Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and 
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1135 (1985) (discussing the changes in the 
conceptualization of international law as reactions to the second world war and the Nuremburg 
Trials). 
In the twenty-first century, the event that so far most clearly demonstrates the 
shortcomings of international law is the undeniable phenomenon underlying the much abused 
term “globalization,” although how international law will react has yet to be seen.  Globalization 
means many things to many people.44 The least satisfying of the many theories or definitions 
simply observes that more business now occurs across borders than did a few years ago.45 More 
troubling theories of globalization invest those relationships with some form of animus, an 
attempt by those who posses power to take advantage of those without.46 The more interesting 
definitions try to explain the increase in transborder relationships, whether through changes in 
technology or changes in attitude.47 For the purposes of this paper, the superiority of one 
definition over another is not relevant.48 What is relevant is the observable and indisputable fact 
underlying the theoretical cacophony – more people are entering into more relationships, without 
reference to political boundaries.49 
These relationships highlight an axiological criticism of international law theory and 
practice.  The theory of international law simply does not explain reality.50 Traditional 
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spans of time-space.”   ANTHONY GIDDENS, CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 14, 21 (1990).  
Roland Robertson similarly acknowledges the impact of technological changes but suggests they 
have lead to a change in the way that people understand the world, a “simultaneity and the 
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GLOBAL MODERNITIES 35 (1995). 
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261-264. 
49 See Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50 (noting that 
relationships are now created with little regard for political boundaries); Barney Warf, 
International Competition Between Satellite and Fiber Optic Carriers:  A Geographic 
Perspective, 58 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 1, 5 (2006) (describing at length “the rapid 
expansion of demand for international telecommunications, itself driven by the steady growth of 
multinational corporations, global business travelers, international tourism, mounting 
transcontinental telephony, and cross-border sales of television shows”). 
50 Hector Fix-Fierro and Sergio Lopez-Allyan suggest that traditional jurisprudential thought is 
ill-prepared to deal with the broad concept of globalization because traditional jurisprudence was 
formed within the concept of the nation/state system.  Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Allyan, 
international law posits a handful of actors in a single, albeit complex, arena.  For the most part 
the theory treats other entities as having only one important relationship – the relationship with 
the nation that represents them in international law as determined through internal processes 
within that nation, internal processes that for the most part lie outside the bounds of international 
law. 
 In reality, however, the vast, vast majority of transnational actors are individuals.  
Individuals enter into thousands of relationships across political borders every day.51 Moreover, 
an individual may belong to several communities, some existing solely within the political 
borders of one country, some explicitly crossing borders, and some with no reference to nations 
at all.  With rare exceptions these groups must create rules and institutions to facilitate their 
relationships.  International law, however, does not recognize let alone explain or make 
predictions regarding these rules and institutions.  International law, therefore, fails as a theoretic 
for the bulk of transnational activity.52 
International law is equally inadequate in practice.  Law constitutes a critical element in 
creating and supporting relationships, and in regulating behaviors inimical to relationships and to 
groups.53 International law, with its focus on only a handful of transnational actors, does not 
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STUDY 16-17 (3d ed. 1990) (a theory is “an intellectual tool that helps us to organize our 
knowledge, to ask significant questions, and to guide the formulation of priorities in our research 
as well as the selection of methods to carry out research in a fruitful manner”); William J. 
Aceves, Institutional Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 Am. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 227, 231 (1997) (“A theory seeks to provide causal explanations of observable 
phenomenon and to provide a basis for predicting future behavior.”).  With respect to legal 
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Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 521, 522 (arguing that legal 
scholarship “frames recommendations, or prescriptions, to legal decisionmakers”), although 
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IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION at xi-xii (1975) (noting 
that markets require institutions); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural 
provide a structure, nor does it itself regulate most inimical behaviours.  The scholarship of 
Douglass North and other institutional economists,54 of Robert Putnam and other development 
theorists,55 and of Neil Fligstein and other business sociologists,56 clearly demonstrate the 
necessity of rules and institutions in effectuating relationships.  International law provides no 
such support or regulation. 
 In the absence of laws that transcend national borders in the same way as relationships, 
transnational groups could create their own extralegal body of rules.57 Such rules, however, 
impose maintenance costs on the group and on society and do not lend themselves to easy 
enforcement.58 The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko represents an alternative interim solution:  
the cobbling together of extant local laws to reach and regulate the behaviors of a transnational 
actor. 
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CALIF. L. REV. 485, 504 (2002) (discussing concern over a decline in social institutions as 
described by Putnam); John Wilson & Marc Musick, The Effects of Volunteering on the 
Volunteer, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141, 142 (1999) (discussing Putnam’s theories); see also 
Sidney Tarrow, Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on 
Robert Putnam, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 389 (1996) (discussing the impact of Putnam and 
especially the concept of institutions). 
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entities); Neil Fligstein, Markets from Networks:  Socioeconomic Models of Production, 32
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Industries, and Firms, 32 THEORY & SOCIETY 505 (2003) (describing economic sociology’s 
attempt to integrate multiple phenomenon and noting Fligstein and other economic sociologists); 
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2.  Pavlo Lazarenko 
In June of 1996, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma appointed Pavlo Lazarenko – a 
former Soviet agricultural boss, governor, government minister, and Ukrainian vice-premier – as 
Prime Minister of the recently liberated nation of Ukraine.59 Shortly before assuming the post of 
Prime Minister, Lazarenko had served as Energy Minister.  Although his supporters argue that 
Lazarenko brought law and order to the sector, his reforms had loopholes through which certain 
individuals could and did profit.  Most notable among these individuals was Lazarenko himself.  
During his tenure as Energy Minister, Lazarenko accrued large quantities of money purchasing 
and selling state energy contracts.  Lazarenko used his control of state petroleum firms to buy 
natural gas at a subsidized rate, which he then sold at world market prices.  Some reports claim 
that he accumulated more than 700 million U.S. dollars through this scheme.  To move and 
launder his illgotten fortune, Lazarenko developed an elaborate network of financial institutions 
in a number of countries.  Domestically, Lazarenko laundered his gains Ukraine’s barter-based 
economy.  Natural gas is the most vital commodity to Ukrainian industry, which often procures 
necessary gas through barter.  Lazarenko therefore was able to leverage illegally procured gas 
into virtually any commodity through unregistered barter transactions; he could then trade the 
goods on the open world market.60 
During Lazarenko’s tenure as Energy Minister, he developed close relationships with 
leaders of various energy industries, including Yulia Tymoshenko, the President of United 
Energy Systems of Ukraine. These allies profited from their relationships with Lazarenko.  
Lazarenko awarded Tymoshenko’s United Energy Systems contract to supply one third of 
Ukraine natural gas needs.  United Energy Systems benefited further from Lazarenko’s 
patronage when, as Prime Minister, he partitioned Ukraine’s energy market into separate sectors, 
awarding single energy firms monopoly rights in specific regions.  Lazarenko facilitated the 
award to United Energy Systems of the most profitable contract rights, those of the industrial 
oblasts. The business associated with these monopolies accrued revenues equal to one fifth of the 
Ukrainian gross domestic product for that year.  Lazarenko allegedly received payments from 
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BREAKTHROUGH 9, 12 (Anders Åslund & Michael McFaul eds. 2006); Charles R. Wise & 
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and Relationships between President, Parliament, and the Prime Minister, in STATE AND 
INSTITUTION BUILDING IN UKRAINE 25, 47 (Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk & Paul D’Anieri 
eds. 1999). 
60 ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE’S ORANGE REVOLUTION 10, 19, 23, 39-40 (2005); Charles Clover, 
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Richard C. Paddock, Ukraine’s Abyss of Despair, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Apr.9, 1999, at A1; Knut 
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Nov. 9, 1999, at i, available at http://www.public-i.org/story_01_1100999.htm. 
various energy companies in exchange for the award of monopolies and in the case of United 
Energy Systems also owned shares.61 
During his tenure as Prime Minister, President Kuchma awarded Lazarenko medals for 
his service to the government.  As foreign governments and the Ukrainian parliament voiced 
increasing concern over the level of corruption in the Ukrainian government, however, 
Kuchma’s support waned.62 In the summer of 1997, President Kuchma forced Prime Minister 
Lazarenko from office.63 Once out of office, Lazarenko became a Kuchma opponent and formed 
his own opposition party, named “Hromada.”  Working closely with Yulia Timoshenko, he set 
out to defeat the Kuchma administration in the next series of elections.64 The use of media 
illustrates the tenor of the political contest.  Hromada contracted to have an offshore company 
buy 500,000 subscriptions to Pravda, a Ukrainian paper with a 35,000 subscription base, and 
entered into a similar deal with Vseukrainskiye Vedimosti. Not surprisingly, those publications 
portrayed Lazarenko quite favorably.65 
Kuchma responded fiercely.  He had the United Energy System’s trading licenses 
revoked and sent auditors to examine United Energy System’s financial records; its bank 
accounts were frozen.  Pravda and Vseurkainskiye Vedimosti were shut down.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine made representations to Parliament about obtaining an agreement 
to institute criminal proceedings against People’s Deputy of Ukraine Pavlo Lazarenko for 
commission of crimes involving corruption.  Lazarenko had hoped for Hromada to catapult him 
into the Ukrainian Presidency.  Instead, probes into Lazarenko’s illegal activities compelled the 
former Prime Minister to flee from Ukraine in 1998.  With the Prosecutor General hunting him, 
Lazarenko fled to Geneva.  The day after Lazarenko fled the country, prosecutors filed 
embezzlement charges against him.66 
In Switzerland, the former Prime Minister was arrested for attempting to cross the border 
using a false Panamanian passport.  The Swiss then charged him with money laundering and set 
his bail at US$2.6 million.  Lazarenko posted bail and promptly fled the country, attempting to 
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enter the United States. Once again, Lazarenko was arrested for using false identification 
documents to enter a country. While in the custody of U.S. authorities, Lazarenko requested 
asylum, claiming he suffered political persecution in Ukraine. This motion was eventually denied 
by the United States, which instead filed its own charges against the former Prime Minister.67 
Ukraine’s initial concern with Lazarenko undoubtedly was driven in large part by 
Kuchma’s anger at the betrayal of a former political ally.  Leonid Kuchma’s presidency, 
however, did not survive the political turmoil of Ukraine.  In 2000, a popular journalist was 
kidnapped and murdered.  Evidence, including audio tapes, linked Kuchma to that crime.  By 
2003, tens of thousands of people demonstrated against rigged elections, corruption, and other 
undemocratic aspects of the Kuchma regime.  In 2005, after a series of contested elections, 
demonstrations and court rulings, Viktor Yuschenko – the leader of the party opposed to 
Kuchma – became the President of Ukraine.68 Yuschenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as 
Prime Minister.69 Tymoshenko, of course, is the former President of United Energy Systems and 
an alleged co-conspirator with Pavlo Lazarenko.  Tymoshenko, in turn, was dismissed by 
Yuschenko along with her cabinet and senior Presidential aides amidst charges of corruption and 
discordance.70 Tymoshenko continues to play an active role in Ukrainian politics, almost 
regaining the position of Prime Minister and continuing to lead a large opposition party.71 
Lazarenko has caused incalculable damage to Ukraine and its people.  Even by the 
standards of Ukraine, a political system described at that time as enduring “widespread 
[corruption] at all levels,” Lazarenko engaged in astonishing degrees of corruption.72 
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Transparency International, a respected nongovernmental body that studies corruption, ranked 
Pavlo Lazarenko as the eighth most corrupt political leader in the entire world.73 The anger that 
Ukrainians felt in response to the corruption of the Kuchma regime, the anger that caused tens of 
thousands of Ukrainians to protest in the streets, is entirely understandable.  Corruption causes 
immeasurable damage, particularly to emerging countries such as Ukraine.  In order to fully 
understand the import of the criminal proceedings against Pavlo Lazarenko, the damage caused 
by corruption must first be examined. 
 
3.  Corruption Damages Emerging Economies Such as Ukraine 
Corruption affects any polity in a negative manner, but its effects are particularly acute in 
emerging economies.  As a country only recently emerging from an authoritarian period, in the 
nascent stages of its commercial and social relationships with Europe and the rest of the world, 
Ukraine fits within both the technical definition and the real world experience of an emerging 
economy.74 
Selçuk Akçay succinctly and chillingly summarizes empirical research on the effects of 
corruption: 
 
It reduces economic growth, retards long-term domestic and foreign investments, 
enhances inflation, depreciates national currency, reduces expenditures for 
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education and health, increases military expenditures, misallocates talent to rent-
seeking activities, pushes firms underground, distorts markets and the allocation 
of resources, increases income inequality and poverty, reduces tax revenues, 
increased child and infant mortality rates, distorts the fundamental role of the 
government (on enforcement or contracts and protection of property rights), and 
undermines the legitimacy of government and of the market economy.75 
Of these, four deserve special attention with respect to emerging economies such as Ukraine:  the 
creation of parallel institutions, the decrease in economic growth and investment, the distortion 
of public decisions, and the undermining of support for government and reforms.  To put the 
matter as succinctly as does Akçay, Ukraine and countries like Ukraine have every right to be 
tremendously concerned about corruption. 
 
3.1 Parallel Institutions 
Corruption leads to the creation of parallel institutions.  Parallel institutions are 
institutions created informally to perform the same functions as “official” or existing 
institutions.76 In lay terms, parallel institutions include institutions such as “black markets” or 
“loan sharking.”77 
Parallel institutions often come into existence as a reaction to failures in state sanctioned 
institutions, as people attempt to concoct means of getting done that which the state cannot or 
will not do for them.78 Patently failed states, such as the rump states of the former Jugoslavia for 
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Kosovo); Adam Raviv. Jigsaw Sovereignty:  The Economic Consequences of Decentralization in 
Post-Dayton Bosnia, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 109, 113-16 (2005) (describing the creation 
of “pseudo-governmental structures,” “para-states,” and “ghost municipalities” in Croatia and 
Hercigovina and noting that “[t]he continuing existence of parallel institutions, and the 
accompanying corruption that is endemic to them, can serve as a barrier to foreign investment”); 
Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System:  The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 56 n44 (2001) (describing the 
creation of parallel institutions among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, including the creation of an 
underground school of law). 
80 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (1996) (describing corruption as dysfunctional); Angel Ricardo 
Oquendo, Corruption and Legitimation Crises in Latin America, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 475, 488 
(1999) (“Moreover, it is precisely the culture of corruption that, to a significant extent, renders 
them dysfunctional and illegitimate.”). 
81 Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 44 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (discussing the disengagement of 
people from state institutions because they mistrust corrupt institutions); James M. Cooper, 
Access to Justice, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 429, 430 (2000) (discussing the withdrawal of Latin 
Americans from use of the judicial system because it is corrupt); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-
Based and Regulatory Approaches:  A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use 
Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 573 (1992) (“Why should 
some individuals observe the law when others can pay to elude it?  If the rule of law isn’t the rule 
of law, can anarchy be far behind?”). 
82 See Manash Ranjan Gupta & Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal 
Credit Market in Agriculture:  A Theoretical Analysis, 64 ECONOMICA 331 (1997) (noting that 
when farmers have to bribe officials to get loans they go the loansharks); Joachim J. Savelsberg, 
Contradictions, Law, and State Socialism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1021, 1033-34 (2000) 
(describing relationship between corruption, market failure and the creation of black markets in 
In some ways, parallel institutions provide a service by allowing people to do that which 
the state will not let them do.83 The creation and maintenance of institutions, however, imposes 
costs on a state or society.84 The existence of a parallel institution essentially means that a 
country is paying double what it would pay if the official institution worked; the money diverted 
to the parallel institutions is money that is not spent on infrastructure or development.85 
3.2  Corruption Negatively Affects Economic Growth and Performance 
Numerous studies find that corruption negatively affects economic growth and 
performance.86 George Abed and Hamid Davoodi, Cooper Drury, Jonathan Kreickhaus, and 
Michael Lusztig, Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, Paulo Mauro, and Vito Tanzi and Hamid 
Davoodi all find a negative correlation between corruption and economic growth.87 Indeed, Pak 
Hung Mo finds that a one percent increase in levels of corruption decreases growth in gross 
domestic product by almost three quarters of a percent.88 
Corruption decreases foreign investment.  Paulo Mauro conducted the most well known 
empirical research demonstrating this effect, finding a “negative association between corruption 
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Woodruff, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2478 (2000) (“Hence, if legal systems are dysfunctional due 
to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all forms of the private order to emerge: relational 
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83 See Priest, supra note 78, at 2288. 
84 See WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 13-14 (1997) (finding that emerging 
economies spend a disproportionate amount of their budget on institutions); Marina Ottaway & 
Theresa Chung, Toward a New Paradigm, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 99, 99 (1999) (stating that 
institutions are expensive, and questioning whether some developing countries can afford the 
institutions that support democracy); Montrose M. Wolf, The Development of the Teaching-
Family Model, 30 J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 381, 381-82 (1997) (comparing the costs of 
different models of institutions). 
85 See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform:  The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA.
J. INT’L L. 167, 185 (1995) (noting the effect that money spent to work around corrupt courts has 
on the ability to develop other institutions in Latin America). 
86 See A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Kreikhaus & Michael Lusztig, Corruption, Democracy and 
Economic Growth, 27 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 121, 122 (2006) (“The predominant, although not 
exclusive, view of corruption is that it is damaging to economic performance as both a tax on 
productivity and a market distortion.”). 
87 GEORGE ABED & HAMID DAVOODI, CORRUPTION, STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES (IMF, Working Paper no. 132, 2000); CARLOS 
LEITE & JENS WEIDMANN, DOES MOTHER NATURE CORRUPT – NATURAL RESOURCES,
CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (IMF, Working Paper no. 85, 1999); PAULO MAURO, THE 
EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON INVESTMENT, GROWTH AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (IMF, 
Working Paper no. 98, 1996); VITO TANZI & HAMID DAVOODI, CORRUPTION, PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH (IMF, Working Paper no. 139, 1997); Drury, Kreickhaus & Lusztig, 
supra note 86, at 131. 
88 Pak Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON. 29, 75 (2001). 
and investment, as well as growth, [that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic 
sense.”89 Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki, and Shang-Jin Wei also find that corruption 
decreases foreign investment.90 Edgardo Campos and others find that while “predictable” 
government corruption yields less of a negative effect, it still yields a negative effect.91 Alberto 
Ades and Rafael Di Tella, Mauro, and Tanzi and Davoodi also find a negative relationship 
between corruption and domestic investment.92 
Other indicators suggest that corruption negatively affects economic performance.  Fahim 
Al-Marhubi finds a positive relationship between corruption and inflation.93 Mohsen Bahmani-
Oskooee and A.B.M. Nasir find that corruption depreciates national currency as measured by 
real exchange rates.94 Dilip Mhookerjee and Ivan Png start, in an interesting exercise, with an 
assumption of no social costs and ignore all transfer costs and are still able to prove that “[f]or 
every outcome when bribery is profitable, there exists another in which bribery is not profitable, 
that yields higher welfare.”95 In other words, in the aggregate corruption always imposes 
economic costs. 
 The economic costs imposed on emerging economies can be quite high.  Hrishikesh 
Vinod finds that “[i]n many developing countries, a dollar's worth of corruption causes a $1.67 
worth of a burden on the economy.”96 Ukraine almost certainly suffers, and in particular 
suffered during Lazarenko’s reign.97 
89 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 705 (1995); see also Paolo Mauro, 
The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross 
Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 83, 91 (finding 
that a measurable decrease in corruption in a country would increase its investment to gross 
domestic product ratio by almost 4% and the annual growth of its gross domestic product per 
capita by almost half a percent). 
90 Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Country-Level Investments and the Effect of Corruption:  
Some Empirical Evidence, 10 INT’L BUS. REV. 687, 696 (2001); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is 
Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 9 (2000). 
91 J. Edgardo Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters, 27
WORLD DEV. 1059, 1065 (1999). 
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The New Economics of Corruption:  A Survey and Some New Results, 45 POL. STUD. 496, 510 
(1997). 
93 Fahim A. Al-Marhubi, Corruption and Inflation, 66 ECON. LETTERS 199, 199 (2000). 
94 Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee & A.B.M. Nasir, Corruption, Law and Order, Bureaucracy, and 
Real Exchange Rates, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 397, 398 (2002). 
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Compensated?, 105 ECON. J. 145, 150 (1995). 
96 H.D. Vinod, Statistical Analysis of Corruption Data and Using the Internet to Reduce 
Corruption, 10 J. ASIAN ECONOMIES 591, 601 (1999).  Vinod expands on a model used by 
Andrei Schliefer and Robert Vishny, which compares corruption to an illegal tax.  See Andrei 
Schliefer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993). 
97 While it does not quantify the damage done to the economy by corruption, the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom country report on Ukraine makes clear that corruption 
plays a significant role in holding back Ukraine’s economic development.  See THE HERITAGE 
3.3  Corruption Distorts Decisionmaking by Public Officials 
Corruption distorts decisionmaking in two profound ways:  by distorting the parameters 
by which decisions are made, and by distorting the pool of decisiomakers.  The consequences of 
a distorted decisionmaking process are severe.  As Josef Zieleniec, former Foreign Minister of 
the Czech Republic, observes: 
 
[C]orruption usurps and replaces other standard selection mechanisms – and thus 
puts the economy in a dangerously irreversible position – one in which reducing 
corruption might actually destabilise the economy.  If a large number of public 
servants are corrupt, a closed system is created, which prevents the country from 
progressing normally.  Suddenly, alternative, honest forms of decisionmaking are 
threatened with extinction.98 
Corruption distorts the process of decisionmaking in two ways.  The most straightforward 
involves the results of economic decision.  Corruption, and especially bribery, often involves 
economic decisions.99 In a rational market system, decisions about which good or service to 
purchase are made on the basis of price and quality.100 A corrupt decisionmaker, on the other 
hand, does not consider price or quality but instead makes a decision based on the size and 
quality of a bribe.101 At best, the product of such decisionmaking is lower quality goods and 
services; at worst the product is large scale misallocation of the limited resources of the polity.102 
Empirical studies bear out this prediction:  Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz de Mello and Raju Sharan find a 
link between corruption and disproportionate military spending,103 while Tanzi and Davoodi find 
a negative relationship between corruption and the percentage of paved roads in good condition 
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EUR. AFF., Autumn 2006, at 12,13. 
99 A striking example particularly pertinent to many emerging economies is the process of 
privatization.  See Kjetil Bjorvatn & Tina Søreide, Corruption and Privatization, 21 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 903, 903-905 (2005) (describing decisions in privatization and possible distortions). 
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102 See Drury, Krieckhaus & Luzstig, supra note 86, at 123 (“policy makers may promote 
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and Mauro finds a negative relationship between levels of corruption and the ratio of both public 
education spending and public health spending to gross domestic product.104 
Corruption also affects the decisionmaking process by creating an incentive for public 
officials to delay, obfuscate or hide information.105 This effect encompasses both poor decision 
outcomes and an inefficient decisionmaking process.  A study of the issuance of driving licenses 
in Delhi, India by Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan 
found both affects of corruption.106 In an endemically corrupt setting, the investigators found 
that seventy percent of those issued driving licenses did not even take a driving examination, and 
that thirty percent of those given licenses could not drive.107 At the same time, the investigators 
found that bureaucrats created artificial barriers and delays, probably for the purpose of 
extracting illegal payments from applicants.108 
Corruption not only causes bad decisions to be made, but it also degrades the pool of 
public officials who make decisions.  “[T]he pervasiveness of corruption contributes to its 
persistence in a significant way”109 by causing capable and honest persons to avoid corrupt 
bureaucracies.110 At the same time, corrupt systems tend to attract corrupt actors, and the 
“‘corruption field’ of social interaction is constantly replenished as new ‘members of the cast’ 
are added to it.”111 Honest people tend to leave, dishonest people tend to join, and the 
bureaucracy suffers. 
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engineers reviewed the quality of roads constructed in Indonesia, Benjamin Olken found a direct 
correlation between corruption and low quality roads.  BENJAMIN A. OLKEN, MONITORING 
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to Studying Corruption (November 2006), available at 
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(observing that capable and honest persons avoid government work for moral reasons when 
corruption is pervasive); Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. &
DEV., Dec. 1995, at 26 (observing that people will seek jobs that pay good bribes rather than jobs 
for which they are qualified); Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the 
Underground Economy in Columbia, 29 J. INT’L STUD. & WORLD AFF. 35, 44 (1987) (stating 
that over time an honest individual in a corrupt system adapts and becomes more dishonest). 
111 Elena Nikolaevna Kofanova & Vladimir Vasilievich Petunkhav, Public Opinion of 
Corruption in Russia, RUSSIAN SOC. SCI. REV., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 23, 23.  While studying the 
Irrigation Department of a State in southern India, Robert Wade found that corrupt senior 
3.4  Corruption Degrades the Quality of Life and Corrodes Support for Reform 
As should be expected of a process that misallocates public and private resources, 
corruption degrades the quality of life for persons living in endemically corrupt polities.  
Scholars have measured several of the ways in which corruption degrades life.  Sanjeev Gupta, 
Hamid Davoodi and Erwin Tiongson, for example, find that corruption increases child mortality 
rates, lowers child birthwieght, and increases the dropout rate of children from primary school;112 
similarly, Maureen Lewis finds strong negative relationships between corruption and the 
performance and viability of healthcare systems.113 Lorenzo Pelligrini and Reyer Gerlagh find 
that corruption negatively affects environmental policy and the quality of the environment.114 
Nejat Anbarci, Monica Ascaleras and Charles Register even find a relationship between 
corruption and increases in traffic fatalities.115 
Bad government and degradation of the quality of life breed cynicism and corrode 
support for government and economic reforms.116 Indeed, many social scientists consider 
corruption to be the single greatest threat to the development of democracy in emerging 
economies.117 Corruption vitiates support for market and economic reform, 118 and – when it 
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supra note 7, at 519 (stating that corruption “is now seen as one of the greatest threats to the 
survival of new democracies around the world”); Mitchell A. Seligson, The Measurement and 
accompanies democratic reform – perversely legitimizes the previous authoritarian regimes and 
even creates a nostalgic longing for those regimes.119 
Susan Rose-Ackerman powerfully summarizes the social affects of corruption:  
“Corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, especially democracies . . .  Citizens 
may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder.  Corruption 
undermines claims that the government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on 
ability to pay.  It can lead to coups by undemocratic leaders.”120 
3.5  Corruption Degrades Ukraine 
Corruption has degraded Ukraine in each of these ways.  Corruption clearly contributed 
to disengagement by Ukrainians from the government and process of government.121 The 
informal market surpassed the formal market in size.122 Corruption stalled or reversed economic 
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and freshly installed free market systems.”). 
119 See Grigorescu, supra note 7, at 519 (discussing the corrosion of support for democracy and 
the nostalgia for authoritarian regimes engendered by corruption); Seligson, supra note 117, at 
382 (discussing the erosion of support for democratic reforms and the use of public disgust with 
democracy by authoritarian leaders).  Several studies empirically measure the decrease in 
support for democracy that accompanies increases in corruption in emerging economies.  E.g.,
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half of economic activity in Ukraine is informal); Zyla, supra note 121, at 259-60 (attributing a 
relationship in Ukraine between corruption and the informal market, and stating that the informal 
market grew in size from 15% if the total economy in 1989 to 40-60% in 1997). 
growth and has left the energy sector in shambles.123 Foreign investors shunned Ukraine.124 
Political leaders made patently bad decisions for very selfish reasons.125 Support for markets and 
reforms diminished substantially, prior to the euphoria that accompanied the ouster of 
Kuchma.126 Corruption has degraded the quality of life in Ukraine in countless ways.127 
Attitudes in Ukraine toward corruption are complex, but in general people in Ukraine 
condemn corruption.128 They should.  As Martin Davies notes, “We delude ourselves if we think 
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bribery to be purely economic conduct incapable of leading to fear, cruelty and humiliation.”129 
The control of behaviors such as those engaged in by Lazarenko constitutes a matter of import to 
the people of Ukraine, the United States, and the global community in general.  Finding a means 
of controlling the behaviors of transnational malfeasors, such as Pavlo Lazarenko, therefore 
acquires special consequence. 
 
4.  United States v. Lazarenko:  Decisions on Motions and a Verdict 
Pavlo Lazarenko engaged in corrupt activity in Ukraine, while serving as a government 
official, and then transferred the proceeds of that corrupt activity to several places outside of 
Ukraine to hide and to launder.  Because his actions crossed political borders, full criminal 
prosecution of his acts would be unlikely in a system in which prosecuting governments 
concerned themselves only with activities that occurred within their sovereign territory.  Such a 
construction essentially liberates a transnational actor such as Lazarenko from any constraints, 
and fails to recognize the realities of transnational relationships.  
 A piece of Lazarenko’s activities occurred within the United States.  Lazarenko allegedly 
transferred more than one hundred million U.S. dollars through various U.S. banks;130 the fact 
that this activity occurred within the United States gave U.S. prosecutors an opening.  The 
United States charged Pavlo Lazarenko with money laundering, wire fraud, transportation of 
stolen property, and conspiracy.131 
The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko is remarkable in a narrow sense as the first time the 
United States has prosecuted a foreign leader in part for crimes committed in that leader’s 
country.132 In a broader and more interesting sense the prosecution cobbles together local laws 
to regulate transnational behavior.  The process of cobbling together local laws to regulate 
transnational actors raises several questions, ranging from the role and administration of those 
local laws to the balancing of sovereignty.  Indeed, the trial of Pavlo Lazarenko was delayed for 
several years, in part because a number of the witnesses were abroad and not available but also in 
part because of the complexity of the case.133 In the pre-trial stages, the Federal District Judge 
issued two orders that illustrate the complexity of these issues and that merit scrutiny. 
 
4.1  The First Order:  The Role of Ukrainian Law 
In response to differing postures adopted by the government and the defense, the court 
asked for briefs and issued an order on the role of Ukrainian law in the prosecution of Lazarenko.  
The government suggested that Ukrainian law should play only a limited role, whereas the 
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Ukraine’s Former Premier to Face US Trial, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at 2. 
131 United States v. Lazarenko, No. 06-10273, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2623, at *3 (Feb. 7, 2007 
9th Cir.) 
132 Matthew J. Spence, Comment, American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters:  Prosecuting 
Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S. Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1185 (2005). 
133 Wilson, supra note 61, at 40. 
defense argued that Ukrainian law played a central role.  The court adroitly addressed the 
relationship between the two sets of local laws with respect to money laundering and the 
transportation of stolen property, but displayed far less care with respect to the issue of wire 
fraud. 
 
4.1.1.  Money Laundering 
The indictment charged Lazarenko with nine counts of money laundering.  Money 
laundering involves a downstream financial transaction intended to conceal the proceeds of a 
known unlawful activity.134 The unlawful activities alleged by the government consisted of 
foreign extortion, wire fraud, and receipt of stolen property.  The charge of foreign extortion was 
supported by 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), which listed at that time135 as predicate crimes “an 
offense against a foreign nation involving . . . extortion.”136 
The phrase “offense against a foreign nation” could be interpreted as meaning that the 
foreign state must be the victim of the alleged act.  In United States versus One 1997 E35 Ford 
Van,137 however, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically 
rejected such an interpretation, holding that it “would unduly limit the ability of the federal 
government to prosecute those who launder money for the purpose of promoting serious criminal 
activity in a foreign country.”138 Such an interpretation clearly comports with the general 
understanding of crime as an offense against the state.139 The interpretation, however, also 
 
134 See Michael McGuinn, Money Laundering, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739, 739-61 (2006) 
(providing a comprehensive review of money laundering). 
135 The actions for which Lazarenko was prosecuted occurred before Congress amended the 
money laundering statute to include “bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, 
or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official.”  18 U.S.C. 
§1956(c)(7)(B)(iv); see W. Clifton Holmes, Strengthening Available Evidence-Gathering Tools 
in the Fight Against Transnational Money Laundering, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 203 
(2003) (discussing this amendment to the money laundering statute). 
136 Section 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii) also lists offenses against a foreign nation involving murder, 
kidnapping, robbery, and the destruction of property by fire or explosion as predicate crimes. 
137 United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van, et al., 50 F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill 1999). 
138 50 F. Supp. 2d at 802.  While One 1997 E35 Ford Van has been mentioned in some scholarly 
discussion, the case is only peripheral to the subject matter of their discussions and no scholar 
has addressed the apparently unremarkable characterization of criminal law by that court.  See,
e.g, Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of Terror:  The Illusive First Amendment Rights of Aliens,
6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 75, 97 (2001) (discussing the factual circumstances surrounding the 
decision). 
139 See Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 392. 
 
Whether one grounds the argument for the social contract embodied in the [U.S.] 
Constitution on Hobbes, Locke, Nozick, Rawls, and other political philosophers, 
the theory is that we cede our right to exact revenge or restitution to the state and 
to the law in return for the state's protection and enforcement of the law.  
Accordingly, the state and federal governments of hold a formal constitutional 
monopoly on the use of force.  The criminal law, enacted by the legislatures, is 
imposes on the prosecution the requirement of demonstrating that the underlying activity of the 
defendant is in fact an offense against the state, that is, that it violates the laws of the country in 
which it occurred.  Indeed, in its order the District Court ordered that the prosecution had the 
burden of proving that the extortive acts alleged to have been engaged in by Lazarenko violated 
Ukrainian law.140 This order represents a significant cobbling together of local laws.  The U.S. 
District Court tried Lazarenko for violation of U.S. laws.  However, because his actions were 
transnational in nature, they involved the laws of another country.  By joining together the two 
sets of laws, the court devised a way to regulate a transnational act even in the absence of a 
transnational authority. 
 
4.1.2.  Wire Fraud 
The indictment of Lazarenko alleged twenty-two counts of wire fraud.  Successful 
prosecution of a wire fraud charge requires proof of “(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) use of the 
wires in furtherance of the scheme, and (3) a specific intent to deceive or defraud.”141 A scheme 
to defraud may include the deprivation of honest services,142 and the prosecution did allege that 
Lazarenko deprived the Ukrainian people of honest services. 
 Prosecutor’s typically charge deprivation of honest services in cases of public 
corruption.143 In spite of its frequent use, however, the statute allowing prosecution for 
deprivation of honest services does not precisely define “honest services.”144 Nonetheless, to 
 
part of that monopoly. Crimes are legally defined as offenses against the state and 
the community, even if those offenses involve the individual victims. 
 
Id.; see also MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 2 (1994) (the prevailing theory of criminal law is that crime is an 
offense against the state); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal 
Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1261 (1994) (same).  Although much of this 
literature is critical of the affects of this theory of crime, Miriam Aukerman points out that even 
in different criminal justice paradigms, such as restorative justice, an important component of 
crime is that it constitutes an offense against the rules and norms of a society.  Miriam J. 
Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional 
Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 78 (2002) 
140 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *12 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003). 
141 United States v. Garlick, 240 F. 3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001); see Skye Lynn Perryman, Mail 
and Wire Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 715-38 (2006) (providing a comprehensive 
overview of wire fraud). 
142 18 U.S.C. §1346. 
143 Adam Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local 
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 397 (1989).   
144 See Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government's Authority to 
Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions 
and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 719 (2000) (referring to the phrase as “amorphous”).   
Aphorisms such as Cervantes’ famous maxim “honesty is the best policy” do not help.  MIGUEL 
DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA pt. 2, book 3, ch. 33 (1615); see 
borrow from a court’s examination of a slightly different relationship, the “language is no more 
general than such terms as ‘due process,’ ‘seaworthiness,’ ‘equal protection of the law,’ ‘good 
faith,’ or ‘restraint of trade,’ which courts interpret every day.”145 Indeed, courts have spent 
several decades elucidating the phrase “honest services.”146 
The majority of courts evaluating a claim of deprivation of honest services by a public 
official apply a fairly broad definition involving a violation of the relationship between that 
official and the public.147 Public officials inherently bear a responsibility to make decisions in 
the public’s best interest and to disclose any conflict of interest in doing so.148 This duty “need 
not be based upon the existence of some statute prescribing such a duty” because an official is a 
“trustee for the citizens and the state . . . and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, 
e.g., honesty and loyalty.”149 Therefore, any “undisclosed, biased decision making for personal 
gain, [regardless of] tangible loss to the public . . . constitutes a deprivation of honest 
services.”150 As John Coffee notes, “[t]he key idea in this now sizable body of law is that a 
public decision-maker must disclose any conflict of interest in a transaction or decision that 
could result in personal gain to the decision-maker.  In addition, any receipt of a gratuity may 
 
Harold H. Punke, Honesty as the Best Policy, 41 J. PHIL. 141, 141 (1944) (critically examining 
Cervantes’ statement). 
145 Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d. 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 1003 (1975) (determining that the trust agreement between the United States and the United 
Nations regarding the Trust Territories of the Pacific is not too vague); see infra note 201 and 
accompanying text (using international trust agreements to illustrate the universal nature of the 
concept). 
146 The development of law regarding deprivation of honest services experienced a brief 
interruption when the Supreme Court declined to find a cause of action in the wire fraud statute 
for harm to intangible rights, stating “we read [the mail fraud statute] as limited in scope to the 
protection of property rights.  If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it 
has.”  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).  Congress promptly answered this 
challenge, passing section 1346 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (1988).  The Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated:  “This 
section overturns the decision in McNally v. United States in which the Supreme Court held that 
the mail and wire fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights.  Under the amendment, 
those statutes will protect any person’s intangible right to the honest services of another, 
including the right of the public to the honest services of public officials.  The intent is to 
reinstate all of the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail and wire fraud statutes without 
change.”  134 Cong. Rec. S17,376 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988). 
147 See George D. Brown. Carte Blanche:  Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials After 
Sabri, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 403, 437 (2005) (“Lukis-Lopez dictates a broad reading of the term 
honest services with respect to a public official”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets 
Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (suggesting that the honest services provision 
“depend[s] on the existence of a special relationship between the parties”).   
148 United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997). 
149 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363, rev’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
150 United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 1996). 
also require disclosure, at least when the decision-maker possesses discretionary authority and 
the payor has an incentive to influence the public official.”151 
Some scholars criticize the phrase “honest services” as vague and imprecise.152 These 
scholars question not only the constitutionality of an imprecise phrase – notwithstanding the 
myriad general phrases interpreted by courts – but also whether it provides sufficient instruction 
to public officials as to how they must act – or more precisely how they may not act.153 Related 
to these concerns, one strand of cases, very thin but discernable, holds that deprivation of honest 
services occurs only through violation of a specific law.  According to this interpretation of 
honest services, “a federal prosecutor must prove that conduct of a state official breached a duty 
respecting the provision of services owed to the official’s employer under state law.”154 
John Coffee, who himself has raised questions regarding vagueness, vigorously 
condemns this approach to honest services.155 He points out that the requirement of a violation 
of a law “could have a devastating impact on the public fiduciary context” and would overturn 
the existing standards regarding honest services “because the common law has never developed a 
substantial body of precedents dealing with the disclosure obligations of the public official.”156 
The effect has even more profound effects in civil law systems, in which principles developed by 
courts are respected but not codified as part of the law.157 
Requirement of violation of a specific law vitiates comprehensive attempts to control 
corruption.  Corruption manifests itself in many forms.158 In general, corruption is the use or 
 
151 John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud:  The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 453 (1998). 
152 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud:  The Continuing Story of the 
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983) (stating that intangible 
rights are too broad and suggesting that they be narrowed by statute); Peter J. Henning, Maybe It 
Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud:  The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. 
L. REV. 435, 440 (1995) (criticizing the statute as imprecise); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The 
Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1181 (1997) (asking for “specific 
federal legislation that closely defines prohibited conduct”). 
153 See John C. Coffee. Jr., Does “Unlawful Mean “Criminal”?  Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L. REV. 193, 207 (1991) (stating that the 
vagueness of honest services raises constitutional question regarding notice and fairness); 
Brown, supra note 147, at 473 (stating that the honest services statute does not provide precise 
guidance to government actors). 
154 United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997). 
155 Coffee, supra note 152, at 447-54. 
156 Id. at 453.  Coffee points out that “the mail and wire fraud statutes were the principal vehicle 
for the development of this law.”  Id.
157 See Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, La nature du droit d'auteur: droit de propriete ou monopole?,
43 MCGILL L.J. 507, 534 (1998) (discussing and using court developed principles not codified in 
French law). 
158 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978) 
(discussing varieties of corruption); see also Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Revisiting Corrupt 
Practices from a Market Perspective, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1998) (“Although 
most, if not all, states confront corruption . . . , corrupt practices are extremely difficult to 
define.”); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of 
misuse of public office or trust for self rather than public interest.159 The specific iterations of 
this concept probably defy statutory listing: the methods of abusing trust or office are as infinite 
as the human mind.160 Therefore, to prosecute only those methods contained on a statutory list 
would eviscerate the state’s ability to control abusive behavior and would give free reign to 
creative corrupt officials. 
 Requiring violation of a specific law also confuses legal compliance with honesty.  Lynn 
Paine accurately describes the relationship between law and ethics as “dynamic and interrelated” 
rather than as exactly correspondent or completely separate from one another.161 Paine suggests 
that “in truth, the relationship between [legal behavior and ethical behavior] is in flux:  the 
prescriptions of law and the prescriptions of ethics . . . coincide to different degrees at different 
times and in different societies.”162 To conflate “honest services” with simple obedience to a law 
demeans the concept of honesty.163 
The court hearing motions on Lazarenko’s prosecution recognized that misuse or abuse 
of a Ukrainian office must be determined on Ukrainian terms.164 Unfortunately, in the 
prosecution of Lazarenko the court ordered that “to prove honest services fraud, the government 
must establish that Lazarenko’s conduct violated the local, state or common law of Ukraine, or 
 
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 788, 798-805 (1985) (describing difficulties in creating a 
specific list of corrupt acts). 
159 See Saladin Al-Jurf, Citizens, National Governments, and International Financial 
Institutions: Changing Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193, 196 (1999) (stating that the World Bank’s definition of corruption is “[t]he abuse of 
public office for private gain”); David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing 
Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719, 720 (1966) (Corruption is the “misuse of authority as a result of 
considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary.”); Philip B. Heymann, Democracy 
and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 323, 325 (1996) (describing “[c]orruption, as secretly 
receiving private benefits to affect a decision that is supposed to be made in the interests of 
others and uninfluenced by private gain. . . .”); Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political 
Development:  A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967). 
160 For this reason, Chief Justice Burger praised the mail fraud statute as a front-line defense 
against new and evolving forms of fraud.  United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
161 Lynn Sharp Paine, Law, Ethics and Managerial Judgment, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 153, 165
(1994). 
162 Id. Indeed, Paine notes that “law is most often a lagging indicator of social ethics.”  Id. at 167. 
163 See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market 
for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 275-76 (2005) (noting that the Security Exchange 
Commission has adopted a simple definition of Rule 406, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2006), and 
that “the Commission’s definition, tracking the language of the statute, directs that a corporate 
code of ethics should promote ‘honest and ethical conduct’ and not simply compliance with the 
law”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1283 (1995) 
(warning of the danger of requiring legal compliance rather than honesty). 
164 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003); see Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational 
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 629 (2000) (observing that although a general 
understanding of corruption exists, its local manifestations may vary). 
that he knew others were doing so on his behalf.”165 In doing so, the court seems to abandon the 
principle that “[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain 
an unfair advantage by corrupting such a one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to 
defraud.”166 
The court’s reference to “common law” is puzzling but could have opened the door to a 
more commonsense understanding of the responsibility of a public official.  Ukraine is not a 
common law country,167 a fact of which the court seemed aware.168 If one substitutes the word 
“principles” for the phrase “common law,” the instructions of the court would makes more sense 
and would also protect the relationship between government and the public.  The court, however, 
did not follow this more sensible path. 
 When cobbling together local laws to regulate transnationally corrupt behavior, a basic 
question when examining allegedly corrupt acts in other countries should be whether the act is in 
fact corrupt in that jurisdiction.  That question, however, should start from the premise that 
corruption consists of the misuse or abuse of power for personal gain, rather than the 
misconception that corrupt acts must be found on a statutory checklist.  George Brown professes 
dismay that “an extraordinary range of corrupt practices, including but not limited to, various 
forms of bribery and failure to disclose breaches of fiduciary duty have been construed to fit 
within the concept of honest services.”169 To average citizens, of either the United States or 
Ukraine, it would probably be far more astonishing if bribery or the breach of fiduciary duties 
were not considered an abrogation of the honest services expected from a public official.  To 
construe the law in any other way would not give effect to the intentions of Congress, and would 
sterilize the law. 
 
4.1.3.  Transportation of Stolen Property 
The indictment also charged Lazarenko with twenty-three counts of interstate 
transportation of stolen property.170 Successful prosecution of this charge requires proof of two 
 
165 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003).  The court took an interesting journey to this conclusion.  The court started 
by acknowledging that the “fiduciary duty to disclose information the public would want to 
know. . . is often defined by state and local ethics laws.”  Id. at *21 (emphasis added).  The court 
then makes reference to a case, from another circuit, in which a court used a violation of local 
law to support the finding of a breach of the fiduciary duty.  Id. at *21 (citing United States v. 
Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)).  From this, the court concludes that the prosecution 
must prove a violation of Ukrainian law.  Id. at *22. 
166 Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). 
167 See Kim Ratushny, Toward the “Independence . . .of Judges” in Ukraine?, 62 SASK. L. REV.
567, 569-70 (1999) (noting that Ukraine is not a common law country and discussing differences 
between common law and former socialist law systems). 
168 See United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25940, at *21 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2003) (recognizing that Ukraine does not share a common law background 
with the United States. 
169 Brown, supra note 147, at 437. 
170 The criminalization of the interstate transportation has special relevance to the regulation and 
control of corrupt activities that cross national borders.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
elements:  (a) that the property in question was stolen, converted, or taken by fraud,171 and (b) 
transportation of that property over a state line.172 Curiously, the word stolen “has no accepted 
common law meaning.”173 Rather than relying on a common law meaning, courts instead look to 
the purpose and intent of a statute containing the word “stolen,”174 although the United States 
Supreme Court notes that “through the years, [‘stolen’] became the generic designation for 
dishonest acquisition” of property.175 
observed that the purpose of such legislation is to reach malfeasors who might otherwise escape 
prosecution simply by crossing a border.  United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384 (1946) 
(the legislation “contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing 
criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate 
commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive 
processes impotent”). 
171 Because the statute requires knowledge rather than belief of theft or fraud, theft or fraud must 
actually have occurred.  See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV.
463, 541 (1992) (“When a legal standard requires knowledge, not simply belief, then the 
standard imposes an additional non-mens rea requirement, namely, that the proposition believed 
is true. This is simply an explication of the concept of knowledge. For example, to be guilty of 
the crime of knowingly receiving stolen property, one must believe that the property is stolen, 
and the property must indeed be stolen. But the mental state is essentially the same whether or 
not the property is actually stolen.”). 
172 18 U.S.C. § 2314;  see Jorge C. Gonzalez, Punishing the Causer as the Principal:  Mens Rea 
and the Interstate Transportation Element of the National Stolen Property Act, 38 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 629, 629 (2001) (discussing and defining the elements of the crime).  Courts do not concern 
themselves over the defendant’s knowledge regarding the transportation of the property.  See 
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970) (“Section 2314 is aimed at the evils 
of theft, fraud, and counterfeiting and not at the regulation of interstate transportation.”).  Rather, 
the critical element is the defendant’s knowledge of the theft, conversion or fraud and the fact 
that theft, conversion or fraud did occur.  See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?:  The 
Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1341, 1386 (2002).  Weiss notes that “the strict liability element is the element conferring 
federal jurisdiction – converting a state offense into a federal offense.  This sort of jurisdictional 
element is typically a strict liability element.  The jurisdictional element is usually one of strict 
liability, precisely because it is not what makes the conduct criminal, but rather what makes it 
criminal under federal, rather than only state, law.”  Id. at 1387. 
173 United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); see Jonathan S. Moore, Note, Enforcing 
Foreign Ownership Claims In The Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 473 (1988) (reporting 
that Turley promotes an expansive definition of ownership and suggesting that an expansive 
definition is particularly appropriate when considering ownership and theft in the context of 
multiple jurisdictions). 
174 Turley, 352 U.S. at 413 (directing courts to “give ‘stolen’ the meaning consistent with the 
context in which it appears”); see Susan E. Brabenec, The Art of Determining “Stolen Property:”  
United States v. Portrait of Wally, a Painting by Egon Schiele, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1369, 1393 
(2001) (stating that Turley asks courts to look at the intent and purpose of statutes using the term 
“stolen”). 
175 Turley, 352 U.S. at 412. 
Placing the meaning of “stolen” within the context of the federal statute in which it 
appears gives the word the color of federal law.  Indeed, the court hearing motions in 
Lazarenko’s case ruled that “federal law controls the question of whether an item is ‘stolen.’”176 
The court also noted, however, that a determination of theft depended on a property interest.  
Finding a property interest becomes interesting when cobbling together local laws. 
 As Emmanuel Kant noted, “the origin of ownership is difficult to comprehend.”177 
Nonetheless, while an inchoate natural right to property may exist,178 law gives expression to the 
right and ability to own property.179 Thus, the law determines what is owned and what is 
stolen.180 Because laws and legal systems differ, however; what a person can own and how 
ownership is perfected or violated vary from place to place.181 
176 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25940, at *31 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 10, 2003) (citing United States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); see Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race:  Moving Beyond the International 
Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 239, 250-
253 (2004) (discussing Wally); Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-Looted Art:  Report from 
the Front Lines, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 306-311 (2001) (discussing Wally). 
177 B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, The Natural Law Duty to Recognize Private Property 
Ownership:  Kant’s Theory of Property in his Doctrine of Right, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 217, 217 
(2006) (quoting Emmanuel Kant:  “Der Anfang des Eigentums ist schwer zu begreifen”). 
178 O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 461 (2004) (describing natural law 
theory of property); see also Karen Clay & Gavin Wright, Order Without Law? Property Rights 
During the California Gold Rush, 42 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 155, 159-163 (2005) 
(describing the creation of property rights in the legal vacuum of California gold rush). 
179 See Byrd & Hruschka, supra note 177, at 220 (observing that law gives expression to the right 
to own property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357-58 (2001) (describing a predominant theory of property:  
“Property is a composite of legal relations that holds between persons . . .”).  Merrill and Smith 
suggest two competing theories of property, both of which depend on law.  Merrill & Smith, 
supra, at 397-98. 
180 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 179, at 362 (“property is important because it gives legal 
sanction to the efforts of the owner of a thing to exclude an infinite and anonymous class of 
marauders, pilferers and thieves”). 
181 See HIROYUKI YANAGIHASHI, HISTORY OF THE EARLY ISLAMIC LAW OF PROPERTY:
RECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT, 7TH-9TH CENTURIES (2006) (describing different 
property system); Lord Hope of Craighead, The Place of a Mixed System in the Common Law 
World, 35 ISR. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001) (noting that common and civil law differ markedly in the 
perfection of property rights); George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating 
Charges and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307, 310 (2003) (describing property law as 
“fragmented” between nations); Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City:  Exploring Property 
and Community in Brazil and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 474 (2006) 
(observing that property laws and societal goals regarding property differ in different 
jurisdictions); Michael J. Whincop, Conflicts in the Cathedral:  Towards a Theory of Property 
Rights in International Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 41, 46 (2000) (noting that property laws differ 
among jurisdictions). 
The Lazarenko court recognized the local nature of property.  Thus, even while 
recognizing that U.S. federal law governs “stolen,” the court ruled that Ukrainian law mattered 
with respect to property rights.182 Again, in cobbling together a means of reaching a 
transnational actor, the court adroitly joined together two sets of local laws. 
 
4.1.4.  Finding Fact and Finding Law 
The consistent reference to Ukrainian law left one last question in the proceeding.  The 
court ruled that it, as the determiner of law, would rule on the content of Ukrainian law and that 
the jury, as trier of fact, would pass verdict on whether Lazarenko had violated that law. 183 
Phrased so starkly, it is difficult to gainsay that allocation of responsibilities.184 Moreover, it is 
singularly unremarkable for U.S. courts, or any domestic court, to rule on the content of another 
country’s laws.185 Such determinations are made as a matter of course.186 The fact that law may 
change rapidly and unpredictably in an emerging economy may make this task difficult, but 
difficulty does not relieve a court of its responsibilities.187 
4.2  The Second Order:  Dismissing Charges 
Immediately following the prosecution’s presentation of its case in chief, the defense 
moved for dismissal of the charges on the (predictable) grounds that the prosecution had failed to 
produce evidence to support the charges.  The court granted this motion in part and denied in 
 
182 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25940, at *32-*33 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2003). 
183 Id. at *34. 
184 See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 698 
(2007) (stating that judges find law and juries find fact); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role 
for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 69, 80 (2003) (stressing the fundamental role of jury 
as factfinder and judge as law finder). 
185 See Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A Comparative 
Study in Private international Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 225 (1995) (“Application, 
proof, and interpretation of foreign law are interrelated subjects that sit at the core of 
international conflict of laws, or, as known in the civil law system, private international law.”); 
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 293 n.175 (1990) (“The 
power of parties to rely on foreign law with respect to interpreting their contract is 
uncontroversial.”). 
186 See Dolinger supra note 185, at 230-32 (noting that France, for example, litigates extensive 
amounts of foreign law in its courts). 
187 See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1170 (1999) (stating that the proper question is not 
whether the task is difficult but instead whether the task is beyond the court’s competence).  
Specifically in reference to discerning international customary law, Judge Edwards stated:  “That 
the task might be difficult should in no way lead to the conclusion that it should not be 
accomplished.”  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
part.188 While the granting of a motion to dismiss rarely elicits notice, this particular order 
highlights the serious problems created by this court’s attenuated definition of honest services. 
 The wire fraud case forced upon the prosecution by that definition did not simply involve 
deprivation of honest services but instead demanded proof of violation of a specific provision of 
the Ukrainian Commercial Code.189 This provision requires an official act, taken for mercenary 
gain, contrary to the interest of service, which causes material harm.190 The affects of this very 
strange use of a statute illustrate the problems caused when officials are asked to comply with a 
statutory list rather than held to a standard of honesty.191 
The court dismissed several charges against Lazarenko because in its mind “[t]he 
government [] utterly failed[ed] to establish material harm.”192 While this conclusion may make 
sense in the context of section 1665 of the Ukrainian Commercial Code, it sounds bizarre 
juxtaposed against the mountain of empirical evidence condemning corruption as utterly 
harmful.193 Lazarenko diverted nearly a billion dollars into his own pocket, he and his cronies 
savaged the energy market in Ukraine, he stunted the development of the industries from which 
he extorted goods and monies, and he and his cronies contributed to a sense of despair and 
futility throughout the country.194 In every sense of the phrase other than, perhaps, that 
extrapolated from a provision of the Commercial Code, Pavlo Lazarenko deprived the citizens of 
Ukraine of honest services, a deprivation for which they suffered. 
 The court’s reliance on a specific, obscure statutory provision is also troubling because it 
displays both legal ignorance and cultural arrogance.  First, the court ignores the fact that 
tribunals in civil law countries use principles just as much as tribunals in common law 
countries.195 Indeed, the principles of honeste vivere, suum cuique tribuere, and alterum non 
 
188 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19660, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. May 7, 2004). 
189 Id. at *8.  The court’s use of the Ukrainian Commercial Code is odd, because the Commercial 
Code did not come into effect until January of 2004 whereas Lazarenko’s acts occurred prior to 
1998.  See IRINA PALIASHVILI, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS OPERATIONS: SUMMARY OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 2 (Roundtable on Enterprise Development and 
Investment Climate in Ukraine June 13, 2006) (stating that the Commercial Code came into 
effect on January 1, 2004 after several years of drafting). 
190 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19660, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. May 7, 2004). 
191 See United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the mere 
acts of bribery or kickbacks are sufficient to demonstrate deprivation of honest services). 
192 United States v. Lazarenko, No. CR 00-284 MJJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19660, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. May 7, 2004). 
193 See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text. 
194 Ukraine’s gross domestic product in 2000 equaled US$ 44.5 billion, making Lazarenko’s 
heist equal to about two percent of the entire country’s product. 
195 See ATHANASSIOS N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW 96 (2d. ed., 1999) (“ in civil law countries judges and lawyers alike start their judicial 
reasoning from statutes as embodying general principles capable of covering any conceivable 
fact situation”); Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part 
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 910-911 (1999) (discussing the inevitability of a 
body of unofficial precedence in civil law countries). 
laedere are foundational in civil legal systems.196 Peter Lindseth succinctly explains the use of 
principles in civil law systems: 
 
Codes can be notoriously vague – the French tort provisions are the favorite 
example of teachers of comparative law – requiring extensive judicial elaboration.  
The current meaning of French tort law has much more to do with well-settled 
precedent – la jurisprudence constante; e.g. relating to strict products liability – 
than the Code’s original references to delictual responsibility for “une faute.”
Codes must also be, by definition, sufficiently general to handle a variety of 
unforeseen circumstances (“feconde en ses consequences,” as the French put it).  
Therefore, the prevailing method of interpretation, to use your terminology, is 
purposive and dynamic (the so-called “teleological method of interpretation”).197 
To assume that a Ukrainian court faced with the question “did Pavlo Lazarenko deprive our 
citizens of honest services” would rely on an obscure provision from the Ukrainian Commercial 
Code is patently ludicrous.198 Sadly, the court was forced into that corner by its own 
misinterpretation of “honest services.” 
 The court’s finding of no material harm also borders on cultural arrogance.  The finding 
implies at least the possibility that the relationship between the Ukrainian government and 
Ukrainian peoples is somehow lower in nature than a similar relationship in a common law 
jurisdiction.  This is not true.  Ndiva Kofele-Kale artfully demonstrates the existence of a general 
duty of care by public officials to the public.199 He explains that 
 
196 Live honestly, do not hurt others, and give to each their due.  JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 1.1; see 
Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 310-11 (1998) (“In my 
judgment, the principles of mutual respect and cooperation for the common good underlie the 
entire Civil Code.  I think of them as being the essence of what Justinian meant by his first 
precept of the law, honeste vivere . . .”); Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a 
Comparative Law Perspective, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 521,533 (2004) (referring to honeste 
vivere, suum cuique tribuere, and alterum non laedere as “fundamental” principles of civil law 
systems); see also Judith K. Schafer, “Details of a Most Revolting Character”:  Cruelty to 
Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1283, 1301 
(1993) (referring to civil law case in which honeste vivere was incorporated by the court into 
duties of a manager (Dwyer v. Cane, 6 La. Ann. 707, 707 (1851)). 
197 E-mail letter from Peter Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal Studies Center, 
Columbia University, to Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University (Apr. 14, 
1998), quoted in Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 236 
(1998). 
198 See Natalie Prescott, Note, Orange Revolution in Red, White, and Blue:  U.S. Impact on the 
2004 Ukrainian Election, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 240-41 (2006) (reporting the use of 
principles and movements toward the informal use of stare decisis and other aspects of common 
law in Ukraine). 
199 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide:  The International Economic Crime of Indigenous 
Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 48, 95-101 (1995). 
an important distinction can be drawn between leaders holding public office and 
the citizens they serve.  Political leaders hold greater power and, therefore, bear 
far greater moral responsibility than ordinary citizens.  A state’s wealth and 
resources are passed down to the citizens and political leaders as the natural 
legacy from previous generations.  Accordingly, a state’s wealth and resources are 
to be held in trust for the present generation of citizens and for those not yet 
born.200 
Kofele-Kale points out that the concept of trust has international recognition, regardless of the 
system of law, as evidenced by the responsibilities allocated by the United Nations through its 
International Trusteeship System.201 It is true that in common law jurisdictions the trust 
relationship often uses the specialized nomenclature of “fiduciary duties,” but the lack of the 
term fiduciary does not mean that other systems do not impose similar duties.202 
Ukrainians in specific also consider the relationship between public officials and the 
public to carry with it duties and standards of care.  The Constitution of Ukraine requires each 
incoming Deputies to swear an oath to “execute my duties in the interests of all fellow 
countrymen.”203 Surveys conducted in Ukraine find that Ukrainians consider freedom from 
corruption an important aspect of democracy, and find disappointment with corrupt officials.204 
The tens of thousands of persons who bore the privations of Ukraine’s winter to protest Leonid 
Kuchma’s corruption each bear witness to the fact that Ukraine society, just as that of the United 
States, places a duty on public officials that includes honesty and fair dealing.  To say that 
Lazarenko did not deprive the people of Ukraine of honest services is to engage in the most 
incapacious of reasoning. 
 
* * * * *
200 Id. at 97. 
201 Id. at 100-101.  In the case of Lazarenko, he would be found to violate the basic “public trust 
doctrine . . . that the state owes its citizens special duties of care, or stewardship, with respect to 
certain ‘common property’ public resources that comprise the wealth of the state.”  Id. at 96. 
202 See Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Socialist 
Economies:  Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 156-157 (1993) 
(discussing analogs to fiduciary responsibilities in socialist legal systems); Mark J. Roe, Legal 
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 466-67 (2006) 
(recognizing differences between common law fiduciary principles and civil law systems, but 
stating that civil law does many of the same things – “they’re just not labeled as fiduciary 
duties”). 
203 UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA (constitution) ch. IV, art. 79 (Ukr.), available in English at 
http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/conste.html.  Ukraine adopted its constitution in 1996, shortly 
before Lazarenko took office as Prime Minister.  See generally Richard C.O. Rezie, Note, The 
Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens’ Rights Provisions, 31 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 169, 169-210 (1999) (discussing and explaining the Constitution of Ukraine). 
204 RAKESH SHARMA, ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 4-5 (2003). 
The jury heard the defense’s case on the charges that were not dismissed.  The jury 
convicted Pavlo Lazarenko on all counts.205 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed Lazarenko’s appeal, sentenced Lazarenko to serve nine years in prison, and 
fined him ten million U.S. dollars.206 The conviction of one of the most avaricious of former 
leaders of a country signals the possibility of a potent new tool in the effort to combat corruption.  
It also demonstrates the need for, and the difficulty in, cobbling together local laws to reach 
transnational actors. 
 
5. Cobbling Together Local Laws in a Sovereign World 
The acts that lead to Lazarenko’s conviction occurred in part while he sat as the Prime 
Minister of Ukraine.  His prosecution and conviction inevitably lead to questions about 
sovereignty.  “Sovereignty” is a phrase at least as abused and maligned as “globalization.”  
Although the term elicits frequent invocation and engenders regular debate, no clear definition of 
sovereignty exists.207 Broadly, the term sovereignty conveys a degree of independence and self-
determination, but even this usage encompasses a wide number of usages.208 
Stephen Krasner groups the many uses of the term into four basic categories:  domestic 
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian 
sovereignty.209 Domestic sovereignty refers to the amount of authority and control a polity has 
within its own political organization and how that authority is manifested and organized – how 
effective the polity is as a state.210 Interdependence authority refers to the amount of control that 
 
205 WILSON, supra note 60, at 40. 
206 United States v. Lazarenko, 469 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2006) amended, rehearing denied,
rehearing en banc denied, United States v. Lazarenko, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2612 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2007). 
207 As Oppenheim noted more than a century ago, “[t]here exists perhaps no conception the 
meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty.  It is an indisputable fact that 
this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present 
day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.”  1 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1905); see also Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and its Relevance to 
Native Americans in the Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487 (1998/1999) 
(“Despite its fundamental nature, however, there is no commonly accepted definition of 
sovereignty.”). 
208 See Hannum, supra note 207, at 487 (“sovereignty may be understood as constitutional or 
legal independence”); 
209 Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED 
RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001). 
210 Id. at 7-8.  In the United Sates, for example, ultimate authority lies with the people, who 
delegate that authority to a system of government divided into three branches.  See Bruce G. 
Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM.
U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (stating that the people are the sovereign, noting confusion around the 
delegation of their sovereign powers, but finding that “[t]he separation of powers operates in a 
more apparent and specific way at what we might identify as a level of ‘fundamental 
sovereignty.’”).  Domestic sovereignty has no dispositive role in other types of sovereignty:  a 
lack of effectiveness would not render a state as something other than a state.  Krasner points out 
a state has over transborder movement.211 International legal sovereignty refers to the 
recognition of a state by other states or international actors.212 What Krasner calls Westphalian 
sovereignty is the most problematic:  it holds that states are independent and autonomous and 
that “external authority structures should be excluded from the territory of a state.”213 
The criticism of most legal scholars is leveled at Westphalian sovereignty;214 indeed, 
most legal scholarship does not contemplate the other uses of the term sovereign.  This usage of 
the term “sovereignty” engenders a criticism very similar to that of international law:  that it does 
not describe the world as it actually exists.215 As David Kennedy points out, states have always 
 
that “failed states” still act as states within the international system and are still accorded the 
dignity of a state by other states.  Krasner, supra note 209, at 7. 
211 Krasner, supra note 209, at 8-9.  Many legal scholars offer control of borders as a 
foundational aspect of sovereignty, although usually in the context of discussions involving 
immigration.  See JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 5 (1999) (arguing that control of borders is a fundamental aspect of 
sovereignty); James A. Casey, Sovereignty by Sufferance:  The Illusion of Indian Tribal 
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 419 (1994) (supporting fundamental notion that 
sovereignty controls borders); Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1087, 1105 (1993) (noting the “basic right” of a sovereign to control its 
borders); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6
(1984) (control of borders is inherent in sovereignty).  Of course, states that do not have 
significant levels of control over transborder movement can still hold the status of a state.  
Lichtenstein, for example, acts as a state even though it has ceded control of its borders to 
Switzerland. 
212 Krasner, supra note 209, at 9-10.  The Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that recognition as a 
state is independent of other types of sovereignty.  Jilani v. Government of Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. 
S. Ct. 139, 181 (Pakistan) (Hamoodur Rahman, C.J.) (“The recognition of a State under 
International Law has nothing to do with the internal sovereignty of the State . . .”); see Thomas 
D. Grant, Current Development:  Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
869, 875 (2000) (“A government is not a State.”).  Alexander Aleinikoff, however, refutes 
Krasner’s distinctions between types of sovereignty, arguing that “[t] his ‘external’ sovereignty, 
based as it is on a norm of noninterference, depends upon the existence and well functioning of 
an international regime of states with the power to recognize those entities whose sovereignty 
must be respected and to maintain order within the regime.”  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:  Reflections on the Customary 
International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 104 n.84 (2004). 
213 Krasner, supra note 209, at 10-12; see Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole:  
Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2004) 
(expounding upon concept of Westphalian sovereignty); Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not 
Perverse:  Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 651 (1997) (same). 
214 See, e.g., Ian Ward. The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091 
(2003); see also David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law:  A 
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 417 (1994) (providing a list of alternative and critical 
scholarship). 
215 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
yielded to some degree of external authority.216 Indeed, the very concept of jus cogens – 
peremptory norms that bind a state because the norm is peremptory rather than because the state 
has consented to those norms217 – suggests the fallaciousness of this articulation of 
sovereignty.218 Nonetheless, the Westphalian conception of sovereignty retains vitality in 
international law and merits attention.  The prosecution of Paulo Lazarenko possibly challenges 
Westphalian sovereignty in two ways:  first by breaching sovereign immunity, and second by 
imperialistically imposing the values of one polity on another. 
 
5.1.  Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
216 David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 353, 
361 (1980) (noting that States “cannot be both internally absolute and externally social”). 
217 The Vienna Convention memorializes the principle of jus cogens: 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.  For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character. 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344; see 
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional 
Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 801-09 
(1990) (discussing at length the principles of jus cogens).  National and international tribunals 
use the concept regularly.  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(reversing dismissal of a complaint because, among other things, the district court did not 
properly consider  jus cogens); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, Nos. 04-CV-5564 (NG)(VVP), 05-
CV-0388 (NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5826, at *52 (E.D. NY Jan. 29, 2007) (discussing 
jus cogens in context of financing of terrorist acts); Juridical Condition and Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, para. 101 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Sept. 17, 
2003) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/juris_ing/index.html (finding that principles of 
equality and nondiscrimination enjoy the status of jus cogens). 
218 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1988) (“Jus cogens is 
capable of invalidating not only conflicting rules drawn from treaties but also rules that would 
otherwise be part of customary international law.”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for 
International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights:  International 
Crimes:  Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 67 (1996) (“a 
jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other norms and principles”); 
David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian law as a Norm of Jus 
Cogens:  Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 228 (2005) (“Peremptory 
norms represent the top of the international legal hierarchy and take precedence over national 
law at the international level and other sources of international law.”). 
Lazarenko’s actions occurred while he occupied a role in the Ukrainian government, and 
therefore introduces the possibility that he deserves “the exemption of the person of the 
sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.”219 Lazarenko in the specific could 
not avail himself of immunity because both the United States and Ukraine favored his 
prosecution.220 Nonetheless, in general the prosecution of bureaucrats in foreign jurisdictions 
raises questions regarding foreign sovereign immunity. 
 Foreign sovereign immunity finds its roots in hoary concepts of sovereignty.  
Technically, the maxim rex non potest peccarre221 applies to the King only within his own 
jurisdiction.  Under the Westphalian idealization of sovereignty, however, all sovereigns are 
equal and inviolate.222 Therefore, if the sovereign is immune within its own jurisdiction, then 
equality requires immunity for all sovereigns – par in parem imperium non habet.223 Because in 
hoary times the sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity, equality required that foreign sovereigns 
also enjoy absolute immunity.224 Thus, when Justice Marshall introduced foreign sovereign 
immunity into U.S. jurisprudence in The Schooner Exchange, he described that immunity in 
absolutist terms.225 
219 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); see Peter J. 
Smith, States as Nations:  Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2003) 
(discussing Schooner Exchange and the development of the foreign sovereign immunities 
doctrine in the United States). 
220 Cf. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying claim of foreign 
sovereign immunity because the United States sought prosecution and Panama declined to 
request immunity), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1060 (1998). 
221 The King can do no wrong.  See William R. Dorsey, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 257 (1997). 
222 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
223 An equal has no dominion over an equal.  See Manooher Mofidi, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act and the “Commercial Activity” Exception:  The Gulf Between Theory and 
Practice, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 95, 97 n.10 (1999); see also THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1970) 
(reciting this history of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity). 
224 See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY i (1963) 
(discussing the breadth of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity at its earliest inception). 
225 See Mofidi, supra note 223, at 96-99 (discussing The Schooner Exchange).  Michael Murray 
convincingly demonstrates that Marshall did not in fact lay out a doctrine of absolute immunity 
and that courts following The Schooner Exchange had some latitude.  Michael D. Murray, 
Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi War Crimes of Plunder and 
Exploitation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 228-29 (2003).  Nonetheless, it cannot be 
gainsaid that the bulk of courts listening to Marshall’s absolutist language felt compelled to 
apply a doctrine of absolute immunity.  See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 3 n.12 (1988) (listing cases adhering to an absolute 
theory of immunity attributed to The Schooner Exchange). 
For many years courts applied foreign sovereign immunity in absolutist terms.226 Cracks 
began to appear as the commercial activities of states rose in prominence and in value.227 
Indeed, the specter of absolute immunity from suit for commercial activities led most countries 
to the creation and application of a relative doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.228 Having 
opened the door to prosecution of claims based on the commercial activities of sovereigns, 
prosecution soon became available for claims of violation of jus cogens, of human rights, and a 
growing list of other issues.229 
This mutability of foreign sovereign immunity more accurately reflects its historical 
application than does a stylized Westphalian vision.  Foreign sovereign immunity has never been 
 
226 E.g., Berizzi Brothers Company v. The Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (applying 
immunity to political and commercial actions); Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n, 2 K.B. 1003. 1013 
(1951) (applying absolute immunity); see SWEENEY, supra note 224, at 20-21 (discussing the 
early application of absolute immunity in Europe). 
227 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326-27 (4th ed. 1990) 
(stating that the absolute doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity prevailed until the rise in state 
commercial activity in the early twentieth century); Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” 
Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:  A Functional Approach to the Commercial 
Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 497 (1992) (“[T]he enormous expansion in 
international commerce meant that most foreign state immunity cases concerned trading 
activities and contractual obligations, not royalty and their ships, diminishing the persuasiveness 
of ‘dignity’ as a rationale for foreign state immunity.”).  The musings of Lord Maugham 
represent typical concerns of that era:  “Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom 
embarked in trade with ordinary ships . . . but there has been a very large development of State-
owned commercial ships since the Great War, and the question whether the immunity should 
continue to be given to ordinary trading ships has become acute.”  Compania Naviera 
Vascongado v The Cristina, [1938] AC 485, 521 (Lord Maugham). 
228 See SWEENEY, supra note 224, at 21 (discussing the causal relationship between state 
commercial activity and the application of relative immunity in Europe); Ved P. Nanda, Human 
Rights and Sovereign Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and 
Diplomatic Immunity) – Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 470 (1999) 
(discussing the commercial exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity). 
229 See Andrea Bianchi, International Decisions: Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 242 (2005) (discussing Italian and Greek cases that limit the application of 
foreign sovereign immunity when violations of jus cogens are alleged); Harlan Grant Cohen, 
Supremacy and Diplomacy:  The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 273, 319 (2006) (stating that war crimes and heinous acts are not protected by foreign 
sovereign immunity); Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of 
International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 513-515 (2003) (discussing 
statutes in several countries that exempt certain behaviors from foreign sovereign immunity); 
Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party 
States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 378-79 (2001) (“Further, it is now generally accepted that state 
officials are not protected from criminal prosecution by the doctrines of foreign sovereign 
immunity or head of state immunity when they commit international crimes such as genocide or 
crimes against humanity, since these are acts which cannot be properly considered as the official 
functions of a State.”). 
a requirement imposed on nations;230 at most it is a broad principle of customary international 
law231 applied in domestic courts as “a matter of grace and comity.”232 Foreign sovereign 
immunity is not memorialized in any widely accepted treaty.  The Brussels Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels233 contains some 
provisions relating to sovereign immunity (for the most part limiting immunity) but was signed 
by fewer than twenty-five countries.234 Similarly, the European Convention on State 
Immunity235 has not been signed by the majority of European nations and it too limits rather than 
expounds sovereign immunity.236 The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their Property237 has opened for signature but has not yet entered into force; it too 
limits sovereign immunity.238 
Foreign sovereign immunity does manifest itself as an articulated statute in the laws of 
most countries.239 From Canada to South Africa, from Pakistan to Singapore, each of these acts 
 
230 See James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 820, 820 (1981) (“Indeed, it has been denied that there is any international law rule at 
all on the subject, a view that would presumably leave each state free to formulate, or negotiate, 
its own rule.”). 
231 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 MICH L REV. 2129, 2161-61 (1999) (stating that customary international law is the 
source of foreign sovereign immunity); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State 
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1839 (1998) (attributing origins of foreign sovereign immunity 
to customary international law).  Patrick McFadden points out inconsistencies in its local 
application that call into question foreign sovereign immunity’s status as customary international 
law.  Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 59 
n.258 (1995). 
232 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); see Lee M. Caplan, The 
Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States:  The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 389 (2001) (“While the 
Supreme Court has constitutionalized the law of jurisdiction over persons and property, it has 
always treated the law of jurisdiction over foreign states and their property as a matter of 
customary international law.”). 
233 Brussels Convention of 1926 for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of 
State-Owned Vessels, Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199. 
234 See Robert Franck, The New Law for the Seas, 42 L.Q. REV. 308, 308-09 (1926) (discussing 
the convention); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest of State-Owned 
Ships:  The Need for an Admiralty Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1274,
1286-89 (1983) (discussing the convention). 
235 European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, ETS No. 74, reprinted in 11 ILM 
470 (1972). 
236 See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens:  A Critique of the 
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 757 (2003) (discussing the convention). 
237 GA Res. 59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
238 David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 194 (2005). 
239 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 cmt. a 
(1987); see ANDREW DICKINSON, RAE LINDSAY & JAMES P. LOONOM, STATE IMMUNITY:
embraces a relative rather than absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity.240 The corpus of 
state laws, together with the skeletal body of treaty, clearly indicates that to the extent 
international custom with respect to sovereign immunity exists, that custom expresses itself as a 
relative doctrine. 
 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, therefore, does not constitute a barrier to the 
prosecution of foreign officials for corruption.  Legal scholars have already engaged in the 
debate regarding the prosecution of sovereign agents for human rights violations;241 the 
expansion of their thinking to include corruption represents only an incremental change.  Foreign 
sovereign immunity is at most a matter of comity between states, and as such it imposes a 
requirement of communication between states, of a coordination of judicial goals and foreign 
relations objectives, and of a balancing of values, rules and fairness.242 The fact that this task is 
difficult does not mean that it is impossible, nor does it excuse courts from its undertaking.243 
SELECTED MATERIAL AND COMMENTARY (2004) (providing legislation on sovereign immunity); 
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UN Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B/20 
(1982) (providing legislative material on sovereign immunity). 
240 See Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798 
(1982) and South African Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1981, Pakistani State Immunity 
Ordinance of 1981, Singaporean State Immunity Act of 1979, each reprinted in UNITED 
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND 
THEIR PROPERTY 20, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.V.10 (1982). 
241 Compare Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity:  Some 
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403 (1995) 
(suggesting that violations of jus cogens trumps application of foreign sovereign immunity) with 
Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus Cogens – Some 
Critical Remarks, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433 (1995) (disagreeing with Reimann on policy 
grounds). 
242 Joseph Glannon and Jeffery Atik are confident that US federal courts, for example, will craft 
rules that are fair and that comport both with the dictates of international law and the goals of the 
domestic polity.  They suggest that  
 
courts will likely impose limits on jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns similar to 
those imposed by the due process clause, as a matter of federal common law, so 
long as the [domestic legislation] does not clearly contemplate wider jurisdiction. 
However, once the political branches expressly authorize wider jurisdiction, these 
court-imposed limits will be superseded by their exercise of the foreign affairs 
power. 
 
Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction:  Suing State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 
675, 696-97 (1999). 
243 See Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term – Foreword:  Of Time and Attitudes 
– Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 82 (1960) (noting that courts have a 
“great and difficult task in our constitutional system of government”); Richard B. Stewart, 
Regulation in a Liberal State  The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1550 
n.53 (1983) (noting that courts commonly undertake very difficult tasks). 
5.2.  Relativity and Imperialism 
Criminal prosecution in one country for acts committed outside its borders sometimes 
raises questions of relativity, on the theory that conduct prohibited by the prosecuting country 
may be countenanced by the country in which the act occurred.244 The extraterritorial 
prosecution of corruption in particular has raised claims of cultural and legal imperialism.245 
Indeed, Steve Salbu claims that imperialism is “an ineluctable reality” of the prosecution of 
extraterritorial corruption.246 Salbu, and others, argue that behaviors considered acceptable or 
even desirable by one culture might be considered corrupt by another, and that to impose one 
value system on another constitutes legal imperialism.247 
The fact that every country in the world criminalizes corruption248 confounds a claim of 
legal imperialism.  The routine extension of criminal rules across borders also diminishes the 
impact of a claim of legal imperialism.  From accounting and financial misconduct249 to terrorist 
acts,250 from sex tourism251 to elusion of taxes,252 a variety of statutes around the world allow for 
 
244 See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational 
Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (1995) (noting criticism). 
245 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights:  The Dialectic of the 
Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 495, 496 (1999) (stating that international anti-corruption 
efforts are “elitist, statist and Eurocentric”); David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption 
Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 458 (1999) (stating that the anti-corruption regimes have 
overtones of colonialism); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market:   A Critical Analysis 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 239 (1997) (stating that 
“efforts to control bribery in other nations constitute moral imperialism”). 
246 Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery:  A Premature Evocation of the 
Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 252 (1999). 
247 See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption:  A Principled Approach; The C2
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 611-15 (2000) (discussing the 
anecdotal, but persistent belief that corruption is accepted in some places). 
248 See id. at 613 (noting that corruption is illegal everywhere). 
249 See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728, 761 (1987) (stating that 
British courts will give extraterritorial effect to a foreign court order dealing with the 
international financial regime); Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions:  Improving 
the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1162, 1269-75 (1987) (describing 
extraterritorial financial regulations). 
250 See Madeline Morris, Terrorism:  The Politics of Prosecution, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 405, 407 
(2005) (“State-sponsored terrorism has led logically to an impetus toward some form of 
supranational or extraterritorial authority for the handling of terrorist offenses.”); Ralph Wilde, 
Legal “Black Hole”?  Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and 
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 740-52 (describing a great number of extraterritorial 
provisions dealing with terrorism and noting that they are “nothing new”). 
251 Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities:  Extradition Under the 
Canadian Charter, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 220 n.371 (1998) (describing Canadian 
extraterritorial laws to combat sexual exploitation of children); Nancy Beyer, Note, The Sex 
Tourism Industry Spreads to Costa Rica and Honduras:  Are These Countries Doing Enough to 
criminal prosecution of extraterritorial acts.  Indeed, customary international law has for 
centuries recognized the universal jurisdiction of local courts to prosecute certain behaviors 
wherever those behaviors occurred, including piracy, slavery and war crimes.253 Clearly, the 
simple act of prosecuting extraterritorial actors or conduct does not always or even often raise 
concerns of legal imperialism. 
 The case at hand, however, does not involve a bad accountant or a sex tourist.  Rather, it 
involves a foreign leader engaged in the process of rebuilding a country following a couple of 
centuries of occupation and the dismantling of many of the local institutions.  Lazarenko’s 
defense hints at accusations of imperialism; he claims that he engaged in these behaviors at a 
time when Ukraine was relatively lawless and freewheeling. 
 The fact a statute makes a particular act illegal does not necessarily mean that the polity 
prosecutes that act.254 Many countries formally recognize “prosecutorial discretion”; by any 
name the choices a polity makes regarding prosecution give effect to the norms of a society.255 
In the United States, for example, various state laws technically criminalize many forms of social 
interaction:  kissing other than in marriage, most forms of sexual contact, underage consumption 
 
Protect Their Children from Sexual Exploitation?, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 301, 327 (2001) 
(reporting that more than twenty countries extraterritorially prosecute sexual exploitation of 
children);  Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds That Congress Can Regulate Sex Crimes 
Committed by U.S. Citizens Abroad – United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 119
HARV. L. REV. 2612, 2614 (2006) (reporting a holding that extraterritorial application of laws 
protecting children from sexual exploitation are legitimate). 
252 See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (stating that extraterritorial 
taxation is “universally recognized” and noting it is “inseparable from responsibility for sharing 
the costs of government”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Cade as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 375, (2006) (noting the legality of extraterritorial taxation); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
378 (1987) (“The grant of some extraterritorial taxing authority to local governments is hardly a 
novelty.”). 
253 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (ed. Stephen Macedo, 2004); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal 
Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal 
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988), see also Henry A. Kissinger, 
The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, 80 FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 
2001. 
254 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 
791 (2006) (“Laws need not be regularly enforced.”). 
255 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 
2280, 2293 (2006) (“Prosecutorial discretion requires policy determinations about how best to 
implement a statutory program.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should 
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 97 (1985) (“What cases are important enough 
to pursue entails policy discretion of the broadest sort. When to withhold remedial sanctions or 
alternatively to make an example of some offender raises issues of basic moral and political 
values.”); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717 (1996) (describing breadth and policy implications of prosecutorial discretion); Stuntz, supra 
note 254, at 791 (“Prosecutorial discretion is, if anything, even broader.”). 
of alcohol, and so on.256 These behaviors are rarely prosecuted.  Indeed, extensive prosecution 
likely would result in social unrest.257 Arguably, societies exist in which corruption is illegal but 
no one anticipates its prosecution.  Extraterritorial prosecution, therefore, would constitute some 
degree of encroachment. 
 The overwhelming mass of evidence suggests that prosecution of corrupt acts does not 
constitute imperialism.  Each of the major religions or schools of moral thought condemn 
corruption:  including Buddhism,258 Christianity,259 Confucianism,260 Hinduism,261 Islam,262 
256 See 18 PA CONS. STAT. § 1301 (defining many types of sexual contact as criminal); Sara Sun 
Beale, From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 747, 752 (2005) 
(“Approximately one fourth of the states, and the District of Columbia, retain laws making 
fornication and cohabitation a crime, and about half of the states, and the military, make adultery 
a crime.”); Peter Goodrich, The Laws of Love:  Literature, History and the Governance of 
Kissing, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 185-98 (1998) (discussing numerous laws 
affecting social interaction); Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking:  Does Current Policy 
Make Sense?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333 (2006) (discussing the relationship between 
enforcement of drinking age laws and social policy). 
257 See Kit Lively, At Michigan State, A Protest Escalated into a Night of Fires, Tear Gas, and 
Arrests, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at  A46 (describing a riot by more than 3,000 
college students protesting enforcement of alcohol laws); Leo Reisberg, Some Experts Say 
Colleges Share the Responsibility for the Recent Riots, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, 
at A48 (describing student riots in response to efforts to enforce underage drinking laws at Iowa 
State University, Plymouth State University, the University of Connecticut, and Washington 
State University).  These protests have involved significant amounts of violence.  See Jane 
Hadley & Steve Miletich, 23 Officers Hurt in Clash at WSU:  National Guard on Alert after 
Party Turns Violent, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 1998, at A1 (describing injuries 
inflicted by students protesting enforcement of alcohol laws at Washington State University). 
258 “Sila [morality] as practiced by the Buddha may be said to be the widest [moral principle] in 
scope. . . .  The second moral precept of refraining from taking what is not given . . . involves 
abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to social disintegration.”  U. 
Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism, in THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM 
1, 17-18 (Samdhong Rinpoche ed., 1972). 
259 Exodus 23:8 (“and you shall take no bribe . . . for a bribe blinds the officials”); Ecclesiastes 
7:7 (“and a bribe corrupts the mind”); see David Neff, When Economists Pray, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 13 (“Corruption ‘so undermines society that there is a virtual breakdown 
of legitimate order.’”  (quoting Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics)). 
260 See J.C. Cleary & Patrice Higonnet, Plasticity Into Power:  Two Crises in the History of 
France and China, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 664, 669 (1987) (“principled Confucian officials often 
lamented that despite their best intentions, the entrenched corruption of the petty functionaries 
made it impossible to put into effect a truly moral administration.”). 
261 In reviewing organic works of the Hindu faith, Upendra Thakur notes that “a perusal of the 
Smrti works makes it clear that the earlier Smrti writers prescribe a much more drastic 
punishment for the bribe seeker [than for the bribe giver,] who finds a graphic mention in one of 
the early inscriptions.  Manu and Visnu also ordain that the entire property of bribe-consuming 
officials should be confiscated by the king.  Yajnavalkya, however, provides banishment for such 
social offenders.  Kautilya, the astute observer of men and affairs, gives a graphic description of 
Judaism,263 Sikhism,264 and Taoism.265 No empirical study has ever found a society that actually 
embraces corruption.266 
To the extent that persons may not expect prosecution, it is more likely the result of 
cynicism than a feeling that corruption should not be prosecuted.  In endemically corrupt polities, 
such as Ukraine while Kuchma was President, enforcement of criminal laws can be very 
difficult.267 The ability to bribe corrupt judges and prosecutors makes enforcement of corruption 
 
measures to apprehend such an official, and like Yajnavalkya prescribes banishment for such 
officials.”  UPENDRA THAKUR, CORRUPTION IN ANCIENT INDIA 14 (1979). 
262 See QORAN, Sura 2:184 (“Not to consume each others’ wealth unjustly, nor offer it to judges 
as bribes, so that, with their aid, you might seize other men’s property unjustly.); Sura 28:77 
(“Allah loveth not corrupters.”).  “Islam as a religious doctrine has waged constant war against 
all forms of corruption. . . .  According to Islam, corruption is a sin for which there is no 
atonement.  The Quran in unmistakable terms has pointed out that all those who indulge in 
corruption will be subject to eternal chastisement.  Corruption is an immoral activity which 
deserves universal condemnation.” SHAUKAT ALI, CORRUPTION: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE 
49 (1985). 
263 See Deuteronomy 16:19 (“neither shall you take a bribe”); 1 SÉFER HAHINUCH, THE BOOK OF 
EDUCATION 325 (1978) (“Among the laws of the precept, there is what our Sages of blessed 
memory said, that both the one who gives and the one who accepts [the bribe] violate a negative 
precept . . ..”). 
264 “The main object of Sikh polity, it may again be emphasized, is ‘righteous rule.’  This can be 
obtained either by transforming the existing corrupt rulers on moral and ethical lines of religion 
through peaceful persuasions, or by replacing their corrupt rule by a ‘just’ regime – if necessary, 
with the help of arms.”  HARBANS SINGH, DEGH, TEGH, FATEH: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND RELIGIO-
POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF SIKHISM 141(1986). 
265 “The courts are all swept very clean; while the fields are full of weeds; and the granaries are 
all empty.  Their clothing -- richly embroidered and colored; while at their waists they carry 
sharp swords.  They gorge themselves on food, and of possessions they have plenty.  This is 
called thievery!  And thievery certainly isn’t the Way!”  LAO TZU, TE-TAO CHING 22 (trans. 
Robert G. Hendricks 1989) (168 b.c.); see also ALI, supra note 262, at 38 (attributing statement 
“The more laws are promulgated the more thieves and bandits there will be” to Lao Tzu). 
266 See Heymann, supra note 159, at 328-29 (“The people of every country hate corruption and 
feel cheated by it.”).  Empirical research has found  small segments of societies that embrace 
corruption.  Research has also found societies in which a majority of people engage in corrupt 
activities, but as scholars from a variety of countries point out, this does not mean that people 
embrace or accept the practice.  The author of this paper has conducted research in Africa, 
Central and East Asia, Europe, and Central America and has found universal condemnation of 
corruption. 
267 See THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE 
WORLD BANK 13 (1997) (noting that official enforcement bodies in corrupt states are themselves 
susceptible to corruption); Celeste Boeri, How to Solve Argentina’s Debt Crisis:  Will the IMF’s 
Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 251 (2003) (“Dependence on [a] legally enforced strategy is 
likely to be ineffective.”); O.  Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property:  A Foundation for 
the Private Market and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 467-68 (2001) (“Other problems 
have been caused by widespread corruption and an inadequate enforcement process to implement 
laws particularly difficult.268 Daryl Levinson warns that weak enforcement agencies confronted 
with powerful corrupt actors will become corrupt themselves269 Corrupt agencies and a 
diminished expectation of enforcement do not constitute cultural acceptance of an illegal act. 
 
6.  Lazarenko-type Prosecutions as a Tool to Fight Corruption 
Ukraine illustrates the sensitivity of this problem in fighting corruption.  The election of 
Viktor Yushchenko represented progress toward a stable and open democratic process.270 The 
 
laws, underscoring the need for a developed legal system to interpret and enforce rules and to 
settle disputes over owned resources.”); Stephen J. Toope, Legal and Judicial Reform through 
Development Assistance:  Some Lessons, 48 MCGILL L.J. 357, 375 (2003) (stating that 
enforcement of corruption laws is impossible if enforcers are corrupt). 
268 See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Foreign Nationals in the United States Witness Security Program:  
A Remedy for Every Wrong?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2003) (“In a number of nations, 
formal institutions are undermined by corruption, violence, or other factors that counteract 
efforts of law enforcement authorities.”); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?:  The 
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (2003) (criticizing “corrupt 
politicians pressing to abolish or weaken regulations and cripple enforcement”); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1398 (2003) (noting that corruption impedes 
the enforcement of rules by state entities); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, 
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 825 (2003) (describing the difficulty of 
pursuing case of corruption against enforcement agencies). 
269 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 390-91 (2003); see Bruce L. 
Benson, Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons” 
Arising with Public Allocation Processes, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1988) (discussing the 
corruption of entities charged with enforcing corruption standards); Hiram E. Chodosh, 
Emergence from the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587, 601 (2003) (“Vague 
ethical norms, a poorly regulated and fragmented body of legal professionals, weak monitoring 
capacity, corrupted review systems, and ineffectual prosecution and enforcement substantially 
sustain systemic impunity for illicit practices.”). 
270 See Anders Åslund, The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, 46
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECONOMICS 327-353 (2005) (discussing the economic policy of 
Ukraine following Yushchenko’s election, which although the author finds excessively populist 
is still much better than that of the authoritarian regime); Taras Kuzio, From Kuchma to 
Yushchenko, PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29, 29-40 (discussing the 
progress made following Yushchenko’s election); Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks on Judicial 
Independence, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1, (2006) (noting the “level of transparency atypical for the ex-
Soviet world” that accompanied the struggle over the election of Yushchenko); Magdaleno Rose-
Avila, Transforming Social Justice:  Stand Up for Your Rights, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 575, 578 
(2005) (“Viktor Yushenko and his supporters protested in the cold wintry streets of Kiev and 
brought the government to a halt.  New elections were ordered and, in the end, Yushenko won. 
Ukrainians stood up for their rights and they succeeded in reaching their goals in spite of the 
enormous challenges that they faced.”); Hans van Zon, Why the Orange Revolution Succeeded, 6
PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS & SOCIETY 373-402 (2005) (explaining how the “orange 
appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko raises questions.  Tymoshenko accrued millions of dollars 
during her presidency of Ukraine Energy Systems.271 In part, her success as president of that 
company emanated from her corrupt relationship with Pavlo Lazarenko.272 During her brief 
tenure as Prime Minister she continued to request extradition of Lazarenko to Ukraine. Without 
casting aspersions on Ukraine, it is fair to question the efficacy of a corruption case against him 
in that country. 
 The tremendous amount of damage wrought by corruption, in tandem with the difficulty 
in eradicating corruption from endemically corrupt systems, has lead to a global, albeit 
uncoordinated, effort to deal with corruption.273 Obviously, improvements to infrastructure, 
education, and the political process garner much attention in this effort.274 The aspect of the 
global effort most pertinent to the Lazarenko prosecution, however, regards adjudication of 
claims of corruption.  This adjudication occurs pursuant to a patchwork of rules and agreements, 
ranging from international treaties to local laws. 
 
6.1  Treaties 
Several treaties, most promulgated within the last dozen years, focus on prosecution of 
corruption.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has promulgated the 
most lauded of the international treaties in its Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign 
 
revolution” succeeded and noting that “the Orange Revolution gives a unique opportunity to 
create a culture of democracy and to establish the rule of law.”). 
271 See MATTHEW BRZEZINSKI, CASINO MOSCOW (2001) (describing Tymoshenko as a billionaire 
and the only female oligarch in the post-Soviet countries). 
272 See Alex Rodriguez, Ousted Premier Eyes Comeback, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 9, 2005, at C3 
(describing the relationship and noting that Tymoshenko was named in Lazarenko’s indictment); 
Andrey Slivka, Bitter Orange, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at mag. 24 (describing this relationship 
and stating that “[h]er rebranding of herself as a populist fighter, then, is one of the stranger 
stories in Eastern European politics”). 
273 See Robert E. Lutz, On Combating the Culture of Corruption, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 263,
267 (2004) (noting the “sea-change” in international attitudes toward corruption and stating that 
“the issue of official and business corruption has become a major focus of international 
cooperation”); Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23 (“[I]t 
is difficult to think of a significant international organization not looking at corruption.”). 
274 The United States Department of Commerce’s Good Governance Program, for example, 
assists governments and businesses in strengthening institutions, developing business ethics, and 
developing strategies to cooperatively combat corruption.  See Good Governance Program, 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/.  Similarly, the World Bank Institute’s Governance and 
Anti-Corruption program attempts to strengthen government institutions.  See World Bank 
Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,menuPK:46
1646~pagePK:64156143~piPK:64154155~theSitePK:461606,00.html.  See generally Philip M. 
Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1307 (2004) (describing 
business lead initiatives to combat corruption).  
Government Officials in International Business Transactions.275 The treaty itself does not create 
regulations; it instead requires signatories to implement functionally equivalent laws.276 The 
treaty sets forth five requirements.  First, the signatory must criminalize the payment of bribes to 
foreign public officials with respect to the conduct of transnational business.277 Second, it must 
take the size of the bribe or of its effects into account and make the bribe subject to seizure or 
provide for comparable penalties.278 Third, the signatory must impose penalties for bribing 
foreign public officials that are comparable to those imposed for the bribery of domestic 
officials.279 Fourth, with respect to jurisdiction, the signatory must provide for jurisdiction over 
 
275 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD/DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16/FINAL (18 Dec. 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, entered into force 15 Feb. 1999 (“OECD Convention”); see Barbara 
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 OECD Convention:  An 
Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37
AM. BUS. L.J. 485 (2000) (lauding the OECD Convention); Hess & Dunfee, supra note 247, at 
602  (“The most significant advancement in the fight against corruption and the strongest 
demonstration of its universal condemnation is the [OECD Convention].”); Nii Lante Wallace-
Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business – The Dawn of a New Era, 24
MELBOURNE U. L.R. 349, 368 (2000) (“Perhaps the most significant step in the efforts to combat 
corruption in global business was taken on 17 December 1997 in Paris, when members of the 
OECD signed the [OECD Convention].”); Jong Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD 
Bribery Convention: Implications for Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN 
L.J. 245, 254 (2000) (“the OECD Bribery Convention has built the most significant multilateral 
instrument in the fight against bribery and corruption”). 
276 See Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism:  A Historical 
Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 893-94 
(2000) (“The aim is that the signatories, by national implementation, will provide clear and 
detailed rules that are functionally equivalent to one another in punishing and deterring bribery in 
international business.”). 
277 OECD Convention, supra note 275, art. 1.  Specifically, article 1 requires that the 
implementing legislation 
 
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence 
under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue 
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official 
act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order 
to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business . . . 
 
Id.
278 Id. art. 3.  If criminal liability cannot be imposed on legal persons under the existing legal 
system of the implementing country, the Convention does not require that criminal liability be 
imposed.  Instead, it requires that other “dissuasive” measures be taken, which might include 
civil monetary sanctions.  Id. art. 3, para. 2. 
279 Id. art. 3, para. 1. 
all such acts committed in whole or in sufficient part within its territory, and if nationality 
jurisdiction is recognized by that country must also extend extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
that principle.280 Fifth, the signatory must allow extradition of its nationals charged with the 
bribery of foreign public officials or must prosecute them itself.281 
The OECD’s treaty is only one of many.  In 1996 the Organization of American States 
promulgated a treaty that requires its members to take certain actions with respect to 
transnational bribery, including the criminalization of bribery of foreign officials.282 The treaty 
also requires signatories to cooperate with one another in the prosecution of corrupt officials and 
bribe givers. 283 The European Union has promulgated two instruments that deal with 
corruption.  The Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the Communities’ Financial 
Interests requires member states to criminalize corruption that involves the financial interests of 
the European Union itself.284 The European Union has also promulgated a general treaty that, 
albeit in a limited way, requires member states to criminalize transnational bribery.285 The 
Council of Europe, a broader grouping than the European Union, has promulgated a treaty that 
imposes on its members requirements similar to those imposed by the OECD’s convention on 
corruption.286 The MERCOSUR Treaty of Asuncion requires MERCOSUR members to impose 
 
280 Id. art 4. 
281 Id. art. 10, para. 3. 
282 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, art. 5; see 
Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Comparison With 
the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 243, 247-49 (1998) 
(discussing the requirement); see Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to Combatting the 
Financing of Crime:  A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 573 (2005) (“The 
involvement by the OECD and the OAS in the implementation of anti-corruption laws have 
contributed positively to the identification of problems and education of states and interested 
parties.”). 
283 The treaty requires signatories to allow extradition of bribe givers and bribe-taking officials 
and contains a pledge that signatories will not invoke bank secrecy laws to impede investigations 
into corruption.  Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 282, art. XIII 
(extradition), art. XVI (bank secrecy); see David P. Warner, Law Enforcement Cooperation in 
the Organization of American States:  A Focus on Remja, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387,
393 (2006) (discussing requirements).  
284 Council Act of 27 September 1996 Drawing up a Protocol to the Convention on the 
Protection of the European Communities' Financial Interests, 1996 O.J. (C 313) 1. 
285 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195/1).  The 
treaty requires members to criminalize bribery of European Union officials or of officials of 
member states.  Id. art. 8; see Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International 
Law, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 395-399 (2000) (explicating two European Union 
agreements). 
286 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Jan. 27, 1999), Europ. T.S. No. 
173; see Jarmila Lajcakova, Violation of Human Rights Through State Tolerance of Street-Level 
Bribery:  Case Study, Slovakia, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111, 122, 130-31 (2003) (discussing 
Council of Europe Convention). 
and harmonize criminal penalties for certain types of corruption.287 The African Union has set 
out a treaty that requires African states to criminalize corruption, to seize proceeds of corrupt 
relationships, and to cooperate in the prosecution of transnational corruption.288 In addition to 
regional treaties, the United Nations has set forth the Convention Against Corruption, which also 
requires criminalization of corruption and requires confiscation of illicitly acquired assets.289 
In general, international treaties first impose on signatory nations a requirement to 
impose criminal penalties on their own residents who enter into corrupt relationships with 
foreign officials, and second coordinate enforcement among signatories.  Treaties do not impose 
controls on the behaviors of local officials, including officials whose behavior crosses state 
borders. 
 
6.2.  International Tribunals 
Although the organic documents of international criminal tribunals do not specifically 
confer subject matter over corruption, such jurisdiction certainly is conceivable.290 Many 
scholars suggest the International Criminal Court as the natural body for enforcing vigorous 
international norms prohibiting corruption.291 Indeed, many countries supported the 
 
287 Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, Annex 
II, art. 12, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1057 (1991); see Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic 
Arrangements and the Rule of Law in the Americas:  The Human Rights Face of Free Trade 
Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 59, 90 (2005) (“the Treaty of Asuncion reflects MERCOSUR’s 
overwhelming sentiment to thwart corruption”). 
288 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, AU Assembly, 2d Ord. 
Sess. arts. 5, 19, 16(c)(1) (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pd
f; see Peter W. Schroth, The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, 49 J. AFRICAN L. 24 (2005) (explicating the convention). 
289 Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/58/422 arts. 1, 51-59 (2003); see Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and its 
Financing:  The Importance of Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law,
50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 588-590 (2005) (discussing the UN Convention). 
290 See Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: 
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 200-204 
(2000) (setting out a careful argument as to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
over corruption). 
291 See Judd Lawler, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t? The OECD Convention and the 
Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1249, 1322 (1999) (noting 
that since the OECD Convention, there have been discussions about the creation of international 
courts of corruption).  For excellent discussions of the development of rules, procedures and 
especially jurisdiction within the International Criminal Court both prior to and after its creation, 
see Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice:  The International Criminal Court 
After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (2005) (discussing developments following the creation 
of the court); Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6
development of the court specifically because prosecution in corrupted local courts proved 
impossible.292 At a minimum, it is likely that an international criminal tribunal could exercise 
jurisdiction to prosecute egregious cases of corruption, particularly if the corrupt acts were 
closely tied with other extreme abuses.293 
International arbitral tribunals do not have the power to prosecute corrupt individuals.  
They do, however, have the power to negate or void transactions in which corruption has played 
a part.  In ICC Case Number 1110, Judge Gunnar Lagergren opened the door for invalidation of 
corrupt contracts: 
 
Finally, it cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law 
recognised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores 
or international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they 
cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.   This principle is especially apt for 
use before international arbitration tribunals that lack a “law of the forum” in the 
ordinary sense of the term.294 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 167 (1995) (discussing the issues and possibilities that preceded the 
creation of the court). 
292 See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13
CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 23 (1998)  (describing how 17 small nations asked the General Assembly to 
establish international criminal court to prevent corruption and avoid overwhelming state 
resources); see also Jennifer Llewellyn & Sandra Raponi, The Protection of Human Rights 
Through International Criminal Law:  A Conversation With Madam Justice Louise Arbour, 
Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, 57(1) U.T. FAC. L. REV. 83, 96 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of an international 
body like the ICC in compensating for flawed or corrupt national prosecutions and failure to 
prosecute international crimes). 
293 See Bruce Broomhall, Looking Forward to the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court:  Between State Consent and the Rule of Law, 8 CRIM. L.F. 317, 332 n.47 (1997) 
(“Prosecutions might also be possible where corrupt officials, rogue elements, or scapegoats 
were involved.”). 
294 ICC Award No. 1110, at ¶ 16, Jan. 15, 1963, 21 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 47, 51 (1996); see 
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1486 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (discussing the case); J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of 
Corruption Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True Meaning of 
Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case. No. 1110, 10 ARB. INT. 277 (1994) 
(thoroughly explicating the decision).  Judge Lagergren’s language became standard.  See, e.g.,
ICC Award No. 3916 (1981), 111 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 930, 933 (1984) 
(“l’arbitre s’est référé à un principe de droit généralement reconnu par les nations civilisées selon 
lequel des ententes violant sérieusement les bonnes mœurs où l’ordre public international sont 
nulles ou tout au moins ne peuvent pas donner lieu à exécution.” [The arbitrator makes reference 
to a principle of law which is generally recognized by civilized nations and which provides that 
agreements that are seriously violating moral rules or the ordre public international are null and 
void and may not give rise to the execution of contractual obligations.]). 
Judge Lagergen excused himself on the grounds of jurisdiction, but following tribunals have 
more aggressively followed his lead.295 The unfolding of this doctrine over the last forty years is 
interestingly.  While a plethora of reasons support an arbitral tribunal’s voidance of a contract on 
grounds of corruption,296 a clear doctrine has emerged that international law and international 
order have developed standards against corruption that an international tribunal must uphold.297 
295 See A. Timothy Martin, International Arbitration and Corruption:  An Evolving Standard, 1
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGT. 1 (2004), available at http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-2-article45a.htm (noting that international tribunals 
have decided at least twenty cases on the grounds of corruption following ICC Award No. 1110); 
Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957,
998 (2005) (noting that rules against bribery are “applied with some degree of regularity”). 
296 Hans Baade explicates quire clearly: 
 
A fairly typical example is an agency agreement by which the agent undertakes to 
procure a government contract for the principal through the payment of a bribe to 
a government official.  This contract is likely to be void under the lex fori in a 
purely domestic setting, and the express selection of another law by the parties 
will not oust the applicability of local invalidating or penal rules, as these remain 
grounded in the ordre public interne in its original (first) meaning.  If the 
government were foreign and the agency agreement were inadvertently governed 
by the law of that prospective third party, it would be void under the lex causae 
and unenforceable in the forum for that reason.  The same result follows if the 
validity of the agency contract is expressly made subject to the anti-corruption 
laws of a third country other than the prospective contracting state, and if the law 
thus chosen invalidates the agency contract.  In the still more unlikely event that 
the foreign lex causae would not invalidate the agency agreement, the forum 
might resort to its ordre public international to refuse it protection nevertheless. 
 
Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 453-54 (1995) 
(footnotes omitted); see ICC Award No. 3913 (1981), Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains,  
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, at 497 (1990) (stating that a contract 
involving corruption was void not only under French law but also on grounds of public 
international order). 
297 See ICC Award No. 8891 (1998), 127 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 4 (2000) (strongly 
condemning corruption and reaffirming arbitrators’ duty to negate corrupt contracts); ICC Award 
No. 3916 (1982), 111 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 930 (1984) (stating that corruption is 
a breach of acceptable standards of behavior, even if it is considered in a particular country as a 
regular means of conducting business); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 294, at 823-24 (describing the development of the 
doctrine that contracts involving bribery are void as against international public policy); Rogers, 
supra note 295, at 998-99 (“[International public policy] is applied with some degree of 
regularity to void contracts for bribery, even if bribery would not invalidate the contract under 
the law chosen by the parties and the issue of bribery was not raised by either party.  These 
doctrines and rules provide a meaningful, even if not impermeable, bulwark against erosion of 
the public realm in international arbitration.” (footnote omitted)). 
The growing number of international treaties that deal with corruption explicitly support the 
tribunals in this finding.298 
6.3.  Local Law 
Local law also contributes to the web of rules regulating corrupt behaviors.  Corruption is 
illegal in every country in the world.299 While the particulars of hundreds of local laws defy 
detailed explication, for the most part these laws impose criminal sanctions on persons who 
corrupt local officials, and on local officials for local corruption.300 Pursuant to international 
treaty obligations, many countries also impose criminal sanctions on private persons who engage 
in transnational bribery.301 On the other hand, no similar treaty provision exists for the public 
analog to these private transnational actors; local laws can only reach part – at most – of an act 
that occurs throughout several jurisdictions.  While the local portion of their corrupt actions may 
be actionable, the totality of their conduct escapes censure. 
 
6.4.  The Role of Lazarenko-type Prosecution 
In the aggregate, these bodies of laws and rules create a network that regulates most 
corrupt behavior.  Graphically, the network could be described as follows:  
 
The Patchwork of Transnational Corruption Regulation 
What Does What  To Whom 
treaties create expectations and requirements of countries 
tribunals criminally prosecute significant events by individuals 
arbitration negate major transactions 
local laws criminally prosecute local public officials 
local laws criminally prosecute local private actors 
local laws negate local transactions 
local laws ignore transnational public officials
local laws criminally prosecute transnational private actors 
This network, however, contains an obvious hole.  Local laws, standing on their own, do not 
reach the full extent of official corruption that crosses borders.  The Lazarenko prosecution fills 
in this hole.  By cobbling together local laws from two jurisdictions, the Lazarenko court enabled 
 
298 See Martin, supra note 295, at 3 (stating that the international treaties on corruption reflect 
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300 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on 
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301 See supra notes 275-289. 
consideration of Lazarenko’s actions.  Rather than ignoring misconduct that occurred in another 
jurisdiction, on a theory that whatever occurs in another jurisdiction must be outside the purview 
of its scrutiny,302 the court not only allowed for consideration of Ukrainian law but also 
undertook the task of determining that law and factually evaluating whether that law was 
violated.  In doing so, the court developed a technique that fills in the gap in the network of rules 
controlling corruption; a technique that other courts can easily replicate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Law supports and regulates interaction within communities.  Communities within nations 
are very important.  They are hardly, however, the only types of communities that people may 
form.  Changes in technology and changes in mindsets allow the formation of communities with 
little reference to political borders.  Local laws that stop at the borders do little to support these 
communities.  International law, which does not recognize most transnational persons as 
legitimate subjects of international law, does even less. 
 Pavlo Lazarenko provides a glaring example of the potential abuse of the holes created by 
the failure of international law.  Lazarenko created a network that moved illegally acquired 
monies across several borders. Lazarenko’s activities are especially damaging because he 
violated the trust placed in him by the people of Ukraine, and in doing so caused extraordinary 
damage to that country.  The behaviors of Pavlo Lazarenko and other corrupt officials necessitate 
control.  Again, however, if local law stops at the border and international law does not 
recognize corrupt officials, then law will not reach the full extent of their actions. 
 The prosecution of Pavlo Lazarenko demonstrates one means of controlling transnational 
corruption, and provides an interesting study of the cobbling together of local laws to deal with 
transnational actions in general.  In order to prosecute Lazarenko in a U.S. court, the court 
melded together the laws of Ukraine and the laws of the United States.  In order to prove its case, 
the prosecution not only had to prove violation of U.S. laws but also had to prove violation of 
Ukrainian laws.  The jury considered the case and rendered a verdict. 
 This court’s adroit melding of laws demonstrates the possibilities attainable by the use of 
local laws.  The court’s clumsy treatment of the honest services required of a Ukrainian official, 
on the other hand, also evince the need for a thoughtful and sensitive approach to the application 
of local laws to an act that crosses borders. 
 Cobbled-together local laws are not a perfect substitute for laws propagated by a 
transnational community itself.  While the Westphalian bestowal of a monopoly in international 
relations to nations does not withstand factual scrutiny, concepts of sovereignty retain vitality 
both in law and in the ordering of transnational relations.  Thus, care must be taken not to 
transgress the law of nations while controlling the actions of individuals.  The prosecution of 
corrupt officials can be accomplished without violating those rules. 
 The prosecution of corrupt officials comprises a critical element of growth and 
development, whether at the global or individual level.  Corruption presents a significant 
obstacle to the enhancement of democratic institutions, and corruption imposes tremendous costs 
on societies and the individual people who make up those societies.  The prosecution of Pavlo 
Lazarenko marks a degree of justice for those who have suffered in Ukraine.  The creation of a 
 
302 A theory that resonates with doctrinal international law.  See supra note 28. 
tool to combat transnational corruption offers possible amelioration for many more who suffer 
the degradations of corruption. 
